Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the
Poor
David A. Supert
Having survived deep budget cuts and the partial dismantlement of their
legal structure, subsistence benefit programs now face an even more severe
threat to their existence: the dismantlement of the agencies that deliver these
benefits. Some states are replacing the agencies operating Medicaid and food
stamps with private contractors while others are simply dismantling the
agencies and leaving low-income people on their own to find free or paid
assistance with application procedures. The loss of these agencies will
irreversibly limit the scope of assistance for the poor. To date, however, critics
have focused on the problems with contracting rather than on the loss of
programmatic capacity.
These programs long have privatized some functions. Whether the
government should continue providing other services itself or should purchase
them on the market is a "make-or-buy" decision familiar to the theory of the
firm. The market is superior to internal production only when the transaction
costs of arranging purchases are less than agency costs within the entity. With
no competitive market for many of the functions required to operate a public
benefit program, privatization is unlikely to be efficient. The earned income tax
credit and disability benefit programs lose much of their benefits' value by
leaving low-income people on their own to find help navigating the application
process.
Inappropriate privatization also can prevent programs from maximizing
the electorate's utility by ossifying policy-making, increasing information
costs, and impairing public officials' agency. Efficiency rather than ideology
should determine the extent of programs' reliance on the private sector.
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INTRODUCTION

Anti-poverty programs require three things to operate. First, they need
money. Second, they need principles for determining who is to benefit and by
how much. And third, they need an administrative infrastructure to deliver the
money (or what it buys) to the people the program intends to help. Over the
past three decades, opponents have assaulted each of these components.
In the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan attacked these programs in
the most direct way, by cutting their funding. Claiming that it was crucial to
revive a sluggish economy, President Reagan pushed through Congress a
package of cuts in social programs of unprecedented depth and breadth. ' The
principal targets were Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the elderly and disabled, and the Food
Stamp Program, but many other programs took hits. 2 After Congress had
enacted the cuts, Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman
admitted that a supposed carefully-crafted economic plan did not, in fact,
exist. 3 As their human toll became apparent, 4 Congress reversed many of the
Reagan cuts and, by the early 1990s, anti-poverty spending was on the
upswing. 5 Because the programs' legal and administrative infrastructure
remained, these restorations were relatively straightforward.
In 1995, Speaker Newt Gingrich and a new conservative Congress
launched a second attack on social welfare programs. By stripping away their
legal infrastructure, these changes made programs' funding levels arbitrary and
hence much easier to cut in the future. 6 As was the case during the Reagan era,
supposed economic necessity formed a crucial part of the argument: welfare
and food stamp caseloads were said to be rising "out of control,"' 7 requiring
urgent action to safeguard the federal fisc. Congress completely eliminated the
legal infrastructure of AFDC and most major federal-state child care and job
training programs;8 it came within a whisker of doing so for food stamps
(ultimately settling for another round of deep budget cuts in food stamps, SSI,

1.
2.

See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF TAX AND BENEFIT REDUCTIONS ENACTED IN 1981
FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERED INCOME CATEGORIES 14-18 (1982).
3. See DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: HOW THE REAGAN REVOLUTION

FAILED 352-53 (1986).
4. See generally RICHARD P. NATHAN ET AL., THE CONSEQUENCES OF CUTS: THE EFFECTS
OF THE REAGAN DOMESTIC PROGRAM ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1983).
5.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING MANDATORY SPENDING FOR

LOW-INCOME FAMILIES NOT RECEIVING CASH WELFARE 3 (1998).
6. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633,
704 (2004) [hereinafter Super, PoliticalEconomy].
7. H.R. Rep. No. 77, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 34-36 (1995); ROBERT RECTOR & WILLIAM
F. LAUBER, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, AMERICA'S FAILED $5.4 TRILLION WAR ON POVERTY 35-36
(1995).
8.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [hereinafter PRWORA].
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and benefits for immigrant families). 9 Once again, the economic argument was
proven false soon after it set political action in motion. Rather than exploding,
caseloads peaked by March 1994, not long after the poverty rate peaked. By the
time Congress acted in 1996, participation in AFDC and the Food Stamp
Program had been falling sharply for more than two years. Once again, antipoverty programs' political support rebounded after the cuts were made. The
Food Stamp Program was restored to political health as a viable means of
support for working families. 10 Cash assistance programs, whose legal
infrastructure suffered the most radical damage, have recovered far less. Yet
although federal law no longer compelled them to do so, states maintained a
largely legalistic administrative structure for their cash assistance programs.
In 2006, a third wave of assaults on subsistence benefit programs began.
This time, two relatively low-profile govemors-Rick Perry of Texas and
Mitch Daniels of Indiana-provided the political leadership. The assaults do
not take the form of congressional legislation attacking subsistence benefit
programs' funding or legal structures. Instead, this movement seeks to
dismantle the organizations that deliver those benefits at the state level,
replacing them with private contractors or even with nothing at all. This
movement has prompted intermittent headlines within those states but almost
none elsewhere. Texas's implementation of "the most sweeping and rapid
privatization of social services in the country" was "plagued with problems.
Tens of thousands of aid recipients can't get through to privately run call
centers. Thousands more poor families are complaining that their children were
wrongly denied health insurance.'' I Texas ultimately was forced to cancel its
contract and try to reassemble the public staff it had disbanded.12 Yet despite
more definitive evidence of harm than either budget cuts or disentitlement
produced, Indiana has moved forcefully ahead with privatizing administration
of these same programs.' 3 And by July 2007, some twenty-one other states
reportedly had contracted out some portions of food stamp eligibility
9. David A. Super, The Quiet "Welfare" Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp
Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1296-1300 (2004)
[hereinafter Super, Quiet Revolution].
10. Id. Although federal law did not compel them to do so, states maintained a largely
legalistic administrative structure for their cash assistance programs under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant that replaced AFDC. The 1996 welfare law's
shift of financial responsibility for cash assistance from the federal government to the states did
effectively prevent the cash assistance rolls from expanding to meet increased need in a recession
for the first time since the Great Depression. The effects of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005's
assault on Medicaid's legal infrastructure remains unclear.
11. Robert T. Garrett, PrivatizedServices Stumbling; Defenders Say Savings, Efficiency in
Social Aid Programs will Take Time, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 28, 2006, at IA; see also
Dana Lachman, Food Pantry Feels Pinch as HHS Changes, BASTROP ADVERTISER, June 17, 2006.
12. Robert T. Garrett, Texas Terminating Deal with Main Social Services Contractor,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 14, 2007, at IA.

13. Tim Evans, FSSA Chief Defends Privatization Deal; Roob Says Massive Report
Typifies OutdatedSystem; Critics Unswayed, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 11, 2007, at 2.
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determination, with five more considering similar moves.14
Like the budget cuts of the early 1980s and the disentitlements and further
budget cuts of the 1990s, the privatization movement initiative motivates
policymakers along fiscal as well as ideological lines. State budgets are facing
simultaneous pressure from rising health care costs, increasing levels of
incarceration, demands for more education spending, extensive federal costshifting, and politically powerful anti-tax movements. Program administration
becomes a politically appealing target during cyclical fiscal crises, and may
remain so, as governors and legislators seek to finance new spending or tax
cutting initiatives. Administrative costs, however, consume relatively small
shares of these programs' budgets. Thus, states must make radical cuts to show
appreciable progress. Proposals to eliminate large numbers of eligibility
workers can plausibly promise savings on that scale; more routine belttightening cannot. Like the earlier assaults on these programs, many
privatization plans are being designed to backload most of their cuts: with few
savings extracted in their early years, opponents have little practical harm to
cite in seeking repeal. IBM has promised to save Indiana half a billion dollars
of administrative savings-a staggering sum that could only come from
massive reductions in staff-but almost none of it is in the first two years of the
ten-year contract, and neither the state nor the company have made public any
details about how those savings will eventually be obtained. Texas, by contrast,
billed privatization as the solution to a short-term fiscal problem, sought to
extract huge immediate savings, and quickly exposed the deficiencies in its
plan.
As with the two earlier waves of assaults on subsistence benefit
programs, 15 a protective counter-effort has begun. In July 2007, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed legislation that would prevent privatization of
16
eligibility determinations and related functions in the Food Stamp Program.
The provision survived, largely along party lines, votes on repeated efforts to
strike it, 7 leaving its ultimate fate unclear at this writing. Even if it becomes
law, however, this provision would not affect any other public benefit
programs, such as Medicaid. Should food stamp administrative funds become
unavailable to pay for contracts with vendors, the administrative and financial
feasibility of privatizing those other programs is unclear. Yet even if the food
stamp anti-privatization amendment passes and becomes a de facto limitation
on other programs as well, one increasingly prominent form of privatization
would be unaffected: the dismantlement of much of the public eligibility

14. See Maureen Groppe, State Welfare Revamp at Risk; Aspects of Federal Farm Bill
Would Force Indiana to CancelPrivatizationEffort, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 20, 2007, at 1.
15. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 9, at 1315-22.
16. See Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 4015
(2007).
17. H.R. REP. No. 110-256, pt. I, at 364-65, 366-67 (2007).
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determination structure without replacement, leaving low-income people to
either to purchase application assistance
services on the private market or to
8
'
them.
without
own
their
on
struggle
Analyzing the privatization movement is particularly vital now because
rebuilding agencies once they are dismantled will prove far more difficult than
restoring budget cuts or recreating legal structures has been in the past. The
cost in time, money, and political capital will likely be unaffordable: building
excitement around restoring subsistence benefits or preserving procedural due

process is far easier than motivating policyrnakers and voters to recreate
bureaucracy. The lack of such a bureaucracy may prevent federal and state
governments from targeting limited aid budgets to those most in need and from
imposing sufficient assurances of program integrity to make programs
politically viable. 19

To date, liberal academic criticism has focused less on economics than on
public values. 20 Some have seen privatization as a threat to government service

as a public-spirited profession. Others see important expressive values in
publicly providing services to those in need. Still others focus on the danger
that privatization will impair due process of law and other modes of holding
the government accountable for programs' performance. 2 This focus of liberal
criticism is ill-advised for political, ethical, and practical reasons.
Politically, arguments about broad public values necessarily talk past the
privatizers' key arguments. For many policyrnakers, the fiscal benefits
promised from private administration will seem far more compelling than the

subjective costs of estranging the people's government from the dispensation of
humanitarian aid. Moreover, to the extent that opponents of privatization raise

claims that sound too ethereal for journalists and much of the public to

18. The Senate-passed version of this legislation would require additional data and review
of such changes, but would provide no new substantive bar to their implementation. H.R. 2419
(engrossed amendment as agreed to by the Senate).
19. See generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (noting that the tax system lacks the
administrative resources to implement many policies important in anti-poverty programs).
20. See generally Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of
Devolution and PrivatizationSubverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573
(2004). In fairness, some public values critiques reflect the same kinds of assessments of the
relative incentives of public and private organizations that animate economic analyses.
21. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367 (2003); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 569 (2001).
22. See generally David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-BasedOrganizations:
A Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1259-66 (2003);
Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in
Local Government Contractsfor Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559 (2001);
but see Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285 (2003) (suggesting that privatization can increase the accountability of private actors).
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appreciate, or too emotional to take seriously, they leave themselves open to

charges that their true motivation is, at best, unjustified nostalgia and, at worst,
shilling for public employee unions. 23 Sensing this, privatization's critics have
focused their attacks on contractors' reliability in the popular media, and now
in Congress. 24 Without a coherent theory as to why contractors are likely to be
unreliable, these arguments are unlikely to win broad acceptance.

Ethically, categorical opposition to private contracting in all of its forms is
unjustified. Few seriously argue that only public employees should distribute
the food that the Food Stamp Program provides or deliver all health care under

Medicaid. Private contractors' role in providing data processing services is
well-established and not especially controversial. Banks redeem vouchers in a
variety of programs. Yet, the public values critique has difficulty distinguishing
between these benign forms of privatization and the liquidation of agencies'

core administrative capacity. A useful theory of privatization must provide a
basis for defeating destructive proposals without cutting programs off from
genuine gains from dealing with the private market.
And practically, reliability arguments offer little guidance on responding
to radical changes in program administration that do not involve the wholesale
replacement of civil servants with private contractors. For example, Colorado
dropped private eligibility workers early in the formulation of its
"modernization" plan, but threw its programs into protracted chaos when it

shifted most of the authority that eligibility workers had exercised to an illdesigned computer system. 25 Florida abandoned private contracting when
senior officials were forced to resign over ethical issues involving other state
contracts, 26 but proceeded with a "modernization" plan that has closed most of
its offices and laid off two-thirds of the staff that determines claimants'
eligibility. 27 In practice, this has meant that low-income people, unable to

navigate the application process themselves, must seek out friends, neighbors,
23. See Garrett, supra note 11, at IA; Ken Kusmer, Union Asks Lawmakers to Intervene in
FSSA Privatization, FT. WAYNE NEWS-SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2006, at lB. The July 2007 House
anti-privatization legislation was proposed to its sponsors by a research and advocacy organization
with which the author has ties. That group is unaffiliated with, and has frequently taken positions
at odds with, organized labor. Nonetheless, once that legislation came into play, it received strong
support from public employee unions.
24. See, e.g., Maureen Groppe & Karen Eschbacher, House Vote Hits Indiana Welfare
Plan; Farm Bill Would Undo PrivatizationEffort, an Act State Says will Cost $125M to Scrap,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 28, 2007, at 4; Ed Gerardot & Lindsey Mintz, Privatization of Social
Services CarriesBig Risks, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 28, 2006, at 7A.
25. David Migoya, Welfare-Benefits System Confuses Feds, Colorado Argues, DENVER
POST, Feb. 16, 2007, at B-03.
26. Mark Hollis et al., Legislators Say DCF Chief Should Resign, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 20, 2004, at B 1.
27. Lloyd Dunkelberger, DCFClosing Welfare Offices; Advocates for the State's Neediest
People Fear Reduced Access to Medical Care and Food Stamps, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE,
Nov. 20, 2004, at Al; see also Interview with Valory Greenfield, Florida Legal Services, in New

Orleans, La. (May 20, 2007).
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or staff from local community organizations to help them. This is a different,
even more radical, form of privatization, with those states leaving low-income
people to identify and motivate replacements for eligibility workers.
Eliminating eligibility workers entirely will make public benefits less
accessible and reduce participation among eligible, needy people. This is the
logical culmination of a regime of public benefits law that relies on deterring
28
participation in lieu of rationing eligibility with explicit substantive rules.
The real threat is not the use of unreliable private contractors but rather
the destruction of stable structures that assist low-income people in establishing
their eligibility. A critique that ignores what is being taken away and instead
focuses on the inadequacies of the replacement being offered is almost
certainly doomed. In late 1994 and early 1995, liberals attacked House
Republicans' Contract with America 29 not for stripping millions of low-income
families of subsistence benefits, but rather for proposing to spend some of the
savings on orphanages for children whose parents would no longer be able to
care for them. 30 The Republicans quickly dropped the orphanages but kept the
benefit cuts and enacted them into law.31 Similarly, attacking private
contractors but not the liquidation of the public bureaucracy is likely to leave
low-income people with even less access to key benefits.
Critics of the movement to dismantle the agencies administering public
benefit programs should follow the example of the conservatives who turned
the tide in the 1970s against persistent efforts to dismantle large corporations
through antitrust law. 32 Those scholars argued that policies promoted as
increasing competition did just the opposite.33 They were dismayed that
policies purporting to protect consumers were creating inefficiencies that would
in fact hurt consumers. 34 Similarly, they saw nostalgic attachment to family
businesses driving policies that burdened small firms. 35 Those scholars
28.

See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice

Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 830-32 (2004) [hereinafter Super,
Invisible Hand]; Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser,

Targeting Transfers through

Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. EcON. REV. 372 (1982).
29. The "Contract with America" was the ten-point election manifesto on which Newt
Gingrich led House Republicans to victory in the 1994 mid-term elections. One of its components
was "welfare reform," which ultimately led to PRWORA.
30. Vanessa Gallman, Gingrich's State-Run Orphanage Plan Hasn't Found a Home,
PHILA. INQ., Dec. 16, 1994, at H5.

31.

Vanessa Gallman, 'New welfare' in 1997 Clinton Promises to Sign Legislation,

DENVER POST, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
32.
See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (2d ed. 1993); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
100, 100b, II 1e6 (2d ed. 2000);
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [Hereinafter POSNER,
ANTITRUST 1st ed.].
33. See BORK, supra note 32, at 7.
l11 e3.
See id. at 7-8; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32,
34.
100b;
See BORK, supra note 32, at 203-05; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32,
35.
DOMINICK

T.

ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE
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condemned an ideologically-driven "nihilism" that demanded the break-up of
large corporations, regardless of the cause or consequences of their size. 36 They
lamented that this populist attack on large corporations would have far-reaching
consequences, destroying the means necessary for undertaking some of this
country's most important activities. 37 This challenge to the purported benefits
of breaking up companies simply because of their size proved overwhelmingly
successful. 38

Today, champions of programs for low-income people similarly need to
show that policies purporting to promote competition would in fact have the
opposite effect. 39 They must dispel the nostalgic, unrealistic assumptions about
the capabilities of small religious groups and other charities invoked to advance
policies that would badly weaken those charities. 40 They must expose the

modem version of what Robert Bork termed "heedless nihilism.

' 41

Just as

conservative economists worried that overzealous antitrust enforcement would

deprive this country of the means to make economic progress, those committed
to a compassionate state have reason for concern that ill-conceived
privatization will both harm vulnerable recipients in the short run and deprive
this country of the basic infrastructure required to pursue a compassionate
agenda.42

This Article seeks to rectify the shortcomings of contemporary critiques of
privatization. It tests privatization against its own measure of success:
economic efficiency. Initially, this is the kind of "make-or-buy" decision
familiar to the theory of the firm. Should the government decide to obtain

services externally, it faces a second-order decision whether to contract for
those services in bulk-for example, by hiring a private contractor to replace its
network of eligibility offices-or to leave low-income people to contract for or
secure donations of application assistance services individually. Because as
many as ten distinct services are required to deliver public benefits, several
different answers to these questions are possible-as well as several different
78 (1982).
36. See BORK, supra note 32, at 5-6; POSNER, ANTITRUST 1st ed., supra note 32, at vii.
37. See BORK, supra note 32, at 4, 9-11 (accusing the Court of "destroy[ing] a broad
spectrum of useful business structures and practices" and declaring then-current policies
"ultimately incompatible with the preservation of a liberal capitalist social order").
38. See id. at ix-x; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW Vii-X (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
POSNER, ANTITRUST 2d ed.].

39. See infra Part II.C.1.
40. See id.
41. Grover Norquist, an influential conservative leader, has declared his intention to
"reduce [government] to the size where [he] can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the
bathtub." Interview by Mara Liasson with Grover Norquist, Morning Edition (NPR radio
broadcast May 25, 2001).
42. Privatization has become a major component of coordinated conservative efforts to
dismantle social welfare programs. See David Stoesz, Responding to the Crisis: Conservative
Prescriptions, in RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 43, 50 (David Stoesz &

Howard Jacob Karger eds., 1992).
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bundlings of these services.
Part II considers the range of possible allocations of responsibility
between the public and private sectors in the operation of means-tested public
benefit programs, programs that base eligibility on claimants' incomes and
sometimes resources. It concludes that neither complete public administration
nor complete privatization are realistic options and, despite the sweeping
rhetoric on both sides, neither is under serious political discussion. Instead,
with one set of functions almost inevitably public and another set firmly
entrenched in the private sector, debates about privatization of public benefit
programs in fact focus on a relative handful of activities, albeit important ones.
Part III examines economic considerations affecting state and federal
governments' ability to benefit from competition for these aspects of program
operations. It identifies the structural issues the government must resolve to
foster competition either by contracting with one or several companies to
provide all of a program's needs for a particular good or service for a specified
period of time, or by allowing private vendors to compete on an on-going basis
to provide each unit of service required. It also examines the programs'
experience with each route, in particular those of the one major federal meanstested program that lacks a full public eligibility determination bureaucracy: the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
Part III then frames this discussion in the broader context of what the
theory of the firm teaches about optimal modes of business organization. Specifically, it explores the circumstances under which coordination of activities
within one entity is likely to produce superior results than competition between
outside firms for the opportunity to provide needed goods and services. It finds
that in many of the aspects of program operations subject to current
privatization debates, conditions are not propitious for competition.
Finally, recognizing that proposals for partial privatization of programs'
operations are, in effect, efforts to break up the large integrated entities-local,
state, or federal agencies-that now run these programs, Part III proceeds to
draw lessons from the branch of law devoted to ensuring that large
combinations of economic power do not obstruct competition: antitrust. It finds
that the agencies now administering many means-tested programs are, in many
respects, horizontally integrated, vertically integrated, and conglomerates. Still,
Part III finds that much antitrust scholarship suggests that action against this
sort of combination is unwarranted. It also finds that tying of some sortproviding one product jointly with another that one wishes to promote-is a
major objective of many of those on both sides of the privatization debate. The
appropriateness of tying the services in public benefit programs to other public
and private services, increasing the likelihood that participants in one program
will obtain other services from the same provider, is largely a normative one
involving the propriety of the government promoting consumption of one kind
over another.
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Part IV moves to the impact privatization may have on the efficiency of
policymaking for means-tested programs. Chiefly, it considers the impact of
contractors treating program information as propriety on the public's access to
information about the program and hence the ability to make informed
decisions about the program's direction. It also considers the potential that
lobbying by those operating a program-public employees or private firmscould distort political decision making.
Part V concludes with a narrow discussion of safeguards that might be
prudent if a political decision is made to continue contracting out additional
aspects of public benefit programs' operations. It also offers some broader
observations about commonalities between this particular privatization debate
and others involving Social Security, other government services, and warmaking. It finds that many of the oft-overlooked factors militating against
additional privatization of public benefit programs' administration also counsel
against radical shifts in the manner in which the government performs those
other functions.
II
OPTIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION

When scholars or policymakers debate privatization of governmentowned businesses, their meaning typically is clear. Before privatization, the
government owned the mine, utility, railroad or bank, made or delegated all
short- and long-term decisions about the business's operation, and absorbed its
profits or losses. After privatization, one or more individuals outside the control
of the government own the business, make its short- and long-term decisions,
and collect its profits or incur its losses.
Debates about "privatization" of public welfare programs typically
operate as if the process under discussion were similarly crystalline. It is not.
As this Part shows, government financing ensures that a substantial public role
will remain under any configuration. Thus, privatization in the context of
public benefit programs involves sharing rather than transferring
responsibilities. The differences between possible methods of sharing
responsibilities may be even more significant than the difference between
"privatization" and traditional methods of administration. Accordingly, much
of what is understood about privatizing enterprises that sell goods and services
in the market is inapplicable to the privatization of public benefit programs.
Analyzing proposals for privatizing the operation of public benefit
programs requires an understanding of the functions required for those
programs to deliver aid to their intended beneficiaries and how these programs
currently divide the various functions between the public and private sectors.
Section A offers a simple typology of those functions. Section B then divides
those functions into three groups: those almost inevitably performed by the
government, those likely to continue to be performed by private businesses, and
HeinOnline -- 96 Cal. L. Rev. 402 2008
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those on which current debates center.
A. The Functions of Public Welfare Programs
Public debates over privatization of government programs tend to have a
misleadingly binary character. Either a program will be privatized, we are told,
or it will not be. 43 More sophisticated analysts may recognize that varying
degrees of private involvement are possible, but fearing or desiring slippery
slopes, advocates on both the left and the right prefer to draw lines in the sand.
Virtually every significant social welfare program is partially privatized;
operating these programs without private entities performing some important
roles is virtually unthinkable in our political culture. On the other hand,
complete privatization is rarely a serious possibility. Indeed, if it were, the law
would provide no obstacle. 44 The fundamental question, then, is which
functions should be assigned to the government and which to private entities.
Once this is resolved, a host of subsidiary questions arise about how the
relationship between public and private participation should be managed.
Operating a public benefit program entails several distinct functions. Any
attempt to list them is inherently arbitrary. Nonetheless, most programs require
eight or ten major steps to deliver benefits to people in need.
First, prospective claimants require some assistance in applying for the
program. Claimants require assistance-both at the outset of their participation
and at periodic eligibility reviews. 45 The extent of the help required varies:
some may require only a copy of the application form and information about
when and where to submit it; others may need help completing the form and
gathering information required to complete the form or to persuade the program
to accept the assertions on the application. The extent of these needs may vary
with the complexity of substantive and procedural requirements, the extent of
its measures to prevent incorrect awards of benefits, and the characteristicssuch as education, disability, and living arrangements-of the individual
claimant. Some programs value eligible persons' participation sufficiently to
conduct outreach to inform prospective claimants of the procedures for
43. A similar false dichotomy afflicts discussions of changing relationships between federal
and state governments. PRWORA, supra note 8, is commonly described as "turning welfare over
to the states." In fact, states already had vast control over the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program that preceded PRWORA's TANF block grant, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 601608 (1994) (repealed 1996), and the federal government continued to exercise substantial control
and to provide an even greater share of the funding for TANF. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 608, 609
(2000) (imposing detailed work requirements on states and providing for a range of penalties on
states not meeting various federal requirements).
44. Completely privatized public benefit programs are called charities. Apart from some
measures to ensure transparent financing, the law does not limit private charities' distribution of
benefits. Only partial privatization, the combination of public financing with private
administration, raises legal issues.
45. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(b)-(f) (2007) (setting out food stamp application
procedures).
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applying.4 6
Second, someone must set eligibility criteria and procedures.4 7 The first
step in this process is typically legislation authorizing the program. Beyond that
are a wide range of definitional questions relating to the substantive criteria and
important details that must be supplied on procedural matters. Some of these
decisions are promulgated in formal regulations, but the volume of issues that
must be resolved is sufficiently large that senior administrators typically must
decide which to address in manuals and which to leave to the discretion of
those charged with making eligibility determinations. To inform policymaking,
someone typically conducts48at least informal research into the program's
operations and effectiveness.
Third, someone must determine whether each claimant meets those
eligibility criteria and procedural requirements. 49 In some programs, this
function may be divided between an initial or presumptive determination and a
subsequent, final decision made by a more responsible authority or one with
better information.
Fourth, someone must keep records of those eligibility decisions. 50 These
records are important to carry out those decisions and to allow for challenges
both by claimants that believe they received too little and by auditors checking
to see if claimants received too much.51
Fifth, someone must issue benefits to claimants found eligible.5 2 To
reduce the risk of corruption, this normally should be someone other than the
person that determines whether individuals are eligible.5 3
Sixth, in many programs, someone
must convert the benefits issued into a
54
form that is useful to the claimant.
Seventh, in many programs, someone must arrange the reimbursement of

46. See, e.g., id. § 272.5 (setting out food stamp policies on disseminating program information).
47. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(c), 2014(b) (2000) (granting USDA authority to regulate the
food stamp program).
48. See, e.g., id. § 2026 (authorizing policy research in the food stamp program).
49. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(g), (i), 273.10 (2007) (setting out food stamp procedures for
determining eligibility).
50. See, e.g., id. §§ 272.1(e)-(f,
272.10, 273.2(f)(6) (imposing record-keeping
requirements on states administering the food stamp program).
51.
See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of
IndividualRights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1097-1117 (2005) [hereinafter Super, Efficient Rights]
(arguing that audits or "counter-entitlements" typically have a greater influence on programs than
claimants' due process rights).
52. See, e.g., Issuance and Use of Coupons, 7 C.F.R. pt. 274 (2007) (setting out food stamp
issuance procedures).
53. See, e.g., id. § 274.3(d)(2).
54. See, e.g., id. §§ 278.1-278.4 (setting out procedures for purchasing food with food
stamps). Even in programs providing cash to recipients, someone must cash the recipient's check
or deliver cash to the recipient in response to an electronic authorization.
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5
the providers that convert the benefits for the claimant.

Eighth, someone must resolve disputes with claimants concerning eligibility and issuance. 56

57
Ninth, someone must pay for the benefits.
Tenth and finally, someone must review performance at each of these

steps to protect the program's integrity. 58
B. The Inevitability of Mixed Administrationof Programs
Complete privatization of all these functions would essentially end the
public character of a program. Terminating a public program is the truest form
of privatization. Numerous such wholly-privatized programs do exist: private
charities. Federal and state law subsidize these private programs' operations

with tax breaks for contributors.5 9 When reducing or eliminating a program,
politicians sometimes argue that private charities can pick up the slack. 6° Little
evidence, however, supports the assumption that private charities have

sufficient excess capacity to replace public programs aiding low-income
people. Indeed, the scope of private charitable giving to low-income people
pales relative to either public spending or need. 6 Thus, current debates start
from the practical reality of partial privatization.

Another sweeping approach is to pay for benefits not with public tax
dollars but rather with moneys extracted from one segment of the public

through regulation. Thus, rent control can be considered a housing subsidy
program funded through regulatory transfers rather than taxation. In a similar
vein, public utility rate regulation that imposes artificially high rates on one
segment of consumers to subsidize services to another privatizes payment for
benefits. 62 Economists, however, tend not to give these schemes high marks for
efficiency, and champions of privatizing public benefits have shown little
interest in adopting this model. 63 Moreover, although the funding of these
55. See, e.g., id. §§ 278.5-278.8 (establishing redemption system for used food stamps).
56. See, e.g., id. § 273.15 (setting out food stamp fair hearing procedures).
57. See, e.g., id. §§ 271.5(a), 278.5(a)(1) (establishing the federal government's obligation
to pay all food stamp benefit costs).
58. See, e.g., id. pt. 275 (requiring states to operate a performance monitoring system under
federal oversight).
59. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 317 (2002).

60.

See Lawrence L. Martin, Privatization and Federal Budget Reform, in FEDERAL

BUDGET AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM 185, 186 (Thomas D. Lynch ed., 1991).

61.

See generally JANET

POPPENDIECK,

SWEET CHARITY? EMERGENCY

FOOD AND THE

END OF ENTITLEMENT (1998).

62. See Barbara A. Cherry, The PoliticalRealities of Telecommunications Policies in the
US.: How the Legacy of Public Utility Regulation Constrains Adoption of New Regulatory
Models, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 770-72 (arguing that public utility regulation should be
considered a component of the welfare state).
63. Rate-setting to cross-subsidize particularly needy groups is not discussed in major
works on privatization of human services. See, e.g., THE PRIVATIZATION OF HUMAN SERVICES:
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subsidies is private, the invocation of the government's regulatory power
effectively compels it to play a substantial policy-making role to determine
how much should be extracted from one segment of consumers and provided to
another.
Although complete privatization of public benefit programs is not
plausible, public programs depend heavily on the private sector. Private firms
and individuals almost always transact benefits, providing rental housing in
exchange for Section 8 vouchers, food in exchange for food stamps, and
medical care to persons presenting Medicaid cards. Private contractors also
commonly design and operate automated record-keeping systems, issue
benefits, design and distribute outreach materials, design and operate systems
to reimburse providers, and conduct program evaluation studies. Indeed, public
benefit programs' reliance on the private sector has increased substantially over
the years and with little controversy. The most significant difference between
the Food Stamp Program and the commodity distribution programs that
preceded it, 64 as well as today's TEFAP, is privatization of the distribution of
food through commercial food retailers. That decision sharply reduced program
costs and increased recipients' choices among foods. Thus, the question about
whether private contractors should have a role in the operation of public benefit
programs has never been seriously in doubt.
The debate about privatization thus centers on relatively few of the
functions required to operate a program, albeit important ones. If the
government is going to pay for a program's benefits (the ninth function on the
list in Section A), few question that it must have the means for overseeing the
integrity of the use of taxpayers' funds (the tenth function). Controlling the
outflow of funds also requires substantial policymaking (the second function).
On the other side, opponents of privatization seem little interested in
reclaiming for the public sector many of the functions that the government long
ago entrusted to private entities. 65 Issuance, conversion, and redemption of
benefits-the fifth, sixth, and seventh functions-were privatized decades ago.
Private companies also have played steadily increasing roles in developing and
maintaining automated record-keeping systems for programs (the fourth
function). Although problems have arisen in each area, no broad
movement to
66
restore these functions to the state appears to be in the offing.
POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES (Margaret Gibelman & Harold W. Demone, Jr. eds., 1998);
PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989).
64. See 7 U.S.C. § 2013(b) (2000) (prohibiting food stamp recipients from simultaneously
participating in commodity distribution programs).
65. The House legislation restricting privatization of the Food Stamp Program contains
exceptions for each of these functions. See supra note 16.
66. Interestingly, Texas, which for a decade has been a leader among states seeking to
privatize responsibility for determining eligibility in the Food Stamp Program, partially restored
state control over food stamp issuance after becoming dissatisfied with what private contractors
were offering.
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The debate attaches primarily to proposals to shift part of one function and
part or all of three others from the government to private firms: assisting
claimants with the application process, making substantive and procedural
policies, determining eligibility, and resolving disputes (the first, second, third,
and eighth functions in Section A's list). Many privatization proposals involve
only some of these activities or would divide some between the government
and private entities. The four disputed activities are different enough from one
another that a sensible allocation of responsibility for one may provide little
guidance as to how another should be handled. Moreover, important differences
among programs may suggest different allocations of responsibility. Finally,
the fact that the government or the private sector may have bungled assigned
responsibilities on some occasions is not definitive evidence that it should not
be entrusted with those responsibilities. If the source of the problems can be
identified as springing from particular structural flaws that could be avoided in
the future, the only conclusions drawn should be about the flawed structure.
The remainder of this Article seeks to combine theory and available
experience to identify the circumstances under which private operation of
public benefit programs may be efficient and those where it may lead to
difficulties. As an initial point, it is necessary to determine which of the four
public benefit program operations at issue are most efficiently performed internally by the government and which are best organized through the price
mechanism on the open market.
III
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTING OUT PUBLIC BENEFIT ADMINISTRATION

Some functions of public benefit programs are most efficiently performed
by the government directly; others are best contracted out. The key to
maximizing the electorate's return on the resources it invests in public benefit
programs is to identify which kinds of activities fall in each category rather
than to allow an ideological preference for or against privatization force an
unwise decision.
An initial caution is in order. Private businesses' reputation for efficiency
owes much to their ability to focus on clear, unitary objectives. Where
providing a good or service cost-effectively is the sole objective, and where
success can readily be measured in dollars, that focus is highly desirable. If the
goal of a mine is to produce as much ore as possible while keeping the
marginal costs of extraction below the marginal value of the ore, politicians'
interest in using mining jobs for patronage, or in limiting competition with a
less-efficient mine owned by their political allies, only gets in the way. Thus,
the effects of privatizing government-owned industries are easy to measure
monetarily-and likely to be positive.
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The goals of public benefit programs, however, are rarely unitary. 67 The
same laser focus on the bottom line that makes private business the most
efficient way of providing most goods and services can hinder and distort the
68
administration of government programs with multiple and shifting objectives.
The satisfaction of the electorate, the owner and investor in public benefit
programs, likely depends not on the magnitude of the dollar return on that
investment but rather on achievements in several quite diverse areas, many of
which are difficult to measure: the amount of hardship averted, the amount of
positive behavior (however defined) stimulated, the success in limiting fraud
and other kinds of undesirable behavior, and so forth. 69 The "bottom line" for
these programs is neither simple nor static.
With this caveat in mind, this Part applies economic and legal theory to
determine which functions required to operate public benefit programs are most
efficiently performed internally by the government and which are best
organized through the price mechanism on the open market. Section A applies
the economic theory of the firm to identify criteria determining whether
production of a good or service is best organized within an organization or on
the market through the price mechanism. It then applies those principles to
determine when the government can most efficiently perform public benefit
programs, which are best purchased from the private sector through long-term
contracts, and which are best obtained through spot purchases as needed on the
private market. Section B considers the possibility of an on-going publicprivate competition to provide services public benefit programs require.
Finally, section C views the concentration of many functions of public benefit
programs in the government through the lens of antitrust law.
A.

Programs' Three Optionsfor Obtaining Goods and Services

Shorn of the emotive rhetoric that surrounds privatization, this debate
essentially concerns the "make-or-buy" decision familiar to businesses and
economists. After seven decades, Ronald H. Coase's article on The Nature of
the Firm remains the starting point for these inquiries. 70 Coase noted that while
decentralized actors guided by the price mechanism controlled the allocation of
resources between firms in the market at large, within a firm a centralized
command and control system determines where resources will go. 7 1 Recog-

67.

See THEODORE R.

MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE:

PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 57 (1990); Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 51, at

1117-18.
68.

See

EVELYN

Z.

BRODKIN,

THE

FALSE

PROMISE

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE

REFORM:

41-77 (1986).
69. See L. Kate Boyer et al., Performance Management: Does it Matter in the New World
of Welfare?, in QUICKER, BETTER, CHEAPER? MANAGING PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 179, 190-94, 199-203 (Dall W. Forsythe ed., 2001).
IMPLEMENTING QUALITY CONTROL IN WELFARE

70.
71.

R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (1988).
See id. at 35; MARTIN RICKETTS, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
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nizing that firms were not necessarily inefficient means of organizing
production despite their failure to rely on competition and the price mechanism,
he sought to understand the circumstances under which a firm can most
efficiently produce goods and services internally, relying on its managers'
allocations of resources, and those under which the firm can obtain goods and
services more efficiently on the open market. 72
The "make-or-buy" decision for the government typically comes down to
three choices. 73 First, the government may make a factor of production-a
good or service required to operate one of its programs-internally, with public
employees. Second, the organization may sign a long-term contract with one or
a few providers to meet its needs for the desired good or service. And third, it
may purchase the commodity on the open market each time it has a need. Thus,
for example, Texas provides security for its legislature itself, it has a long-term
contract with the Daughters of the Texas Revolution to provide tours of the
Alamo, and presumably it buys paper clips as needed on the open market.
This section considers each of these options. Subsection 1 begins by
identifying eight significant factors that economic theory has identified as
determining whether internal production or purchases on an external market are
the most efficient method of obtaining needed goods and services. Subsection 2
then considers what those factors can teach us about the optimal organization of
means-tested public benefit programs.
1. Privatizationand the Theory of the Firm
Coase and his successors 74 concluded that the transaction costs of
purchasing goods and services on the open market are the main factor that
makes firms an efficient method of economic organization. 75 "Were markets
costless to use, there would be no need to give up the flexibility and
' 76
independence of exchange when cooperation with others is advantageous. "
19 (1987).
72. The contrast between internal and external production need not be quite so stark. Even
within a firm, units may bid for staff, space, and other resources or may be rewarded with those
resources based on their profitability. See COASE, supra note 70, at 36.
73. Economic theory identifies a more nuanced array of subtypes of transaction modes, but
each generally resolves itself into one of these three major types. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE
ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS 64-72 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES]; RICKETTS, supra note 71, at 38-42, 202-04.
74. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 73; Armen A. Alchian
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777 (1972).
75. See COASE, supra note 70, at 38-40. In addition, the tax system may treat transactions
within a firm differently from those in the private market, giving firms an incentive to produce
internally in marginal cases. See id. at 41. This seems unlikely to affect significantly privatization
decisions in public benefit programs.
76. HAROLD DEMSETZ, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION
25 (1982).
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN THEORIES OF THE FIRM
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Put simply, internal production avoids the costs of determining the best price,

misestimating future needs, negotiating contracts, monitoring the contractor's
77
performance, and insuring against the contractor's non-performance.
Applying this analytical framework to privatization debates is logical since
state coordination long has been recognized as a means of overcoming
transaction costs. 78
The theory of the firm 79 identifies several factors that determine whether

internal production is more efficient than obtaining a needed good or service on
the open market. First, where the transaction costs of purchasing through the
market are relatively low, internal production will be a less appealing

alternative. Conversely, firms will tend to internalize production more "the less
the costs of organizing and the slower
these costs rise with an increase in the
81
internally.
organized"
transactions
Second, purchases in external markets are more likely to be advantageous
where the government is purchasing "products or services [that] are essentially
the same . ..because unit prices and units of products and services can be
measured, and measured relatively well. Many of the routine service require-

ments [of the government] fit into this category, [such as the] internal supply of
labor and consumables used to provide services." 82 Put another way, the
transaction costs of ascertaining a fair price for a well-defined product are
lower than the costs of pricing one that does not have a well-developed

market. 83 Similarly,

the transaction

costs of enforcing contracts

for

standardized products are lower than for those costs subject to complex, and
possibly subjective, specifications. 84 Conversely, where the goods or services
sought are complex, with important features that are difficult to set out in
contractual terms, internal production can prove beneficial because of

managers' greater opportunities for oversight. 85 Internal control mechanisms
77. Seeid. at 41.
78. See RICKETTS, supra note 71, at 35-36.
79. We are concerned with only that aspect of theory addressing the optimal size for an
enterprise. Except to the extent that Part IV, infra, discusses how partial privatization can cause
agency problems for the electorate, we are not concerned with the elaborate theory of which
organizational and financial structures would best serve particular kinds of businesses. Nor need
we attempt to characterize the nature of a firm, whether as a nexus of partial contracts or
otherwise. See generally MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL

(2000).
80. Coase and others appropriately rejected the simplistic notion that whichever method of
organizing production yields the lowest nominal price is superior. Not only is determining the true
cost of internal production difficult, but also "[c]ompeting through product quality, contractual
arrangements, and institutional innovation ...all become meaningful." DEMSETZ, supra note 76,
at 18.
81.
COASE, supra note 70, at 45; See also DEMSETZ, supra note 76, at 25, 32-34.
82.
JERRY L. MCCAFFERY & L.R. JONES, BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 324 (2001).

83.
84.
85.

See RICKETTS, supra note 71, at 25-27.
See id. at 27-29, 214-16.
See MCCAFFERY & JONES, supra note 82, at 324 (finding internal production
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can organize production where detailed contracts are impossible.
Third, where the available market is relatively competitive, it will be more
likely to offer prices lower than the firm's internal production costs. On the
other hand, markets with few suppliers and high access barriers may demand
substantial rents. "Where no market exists, there is no advantage to contracting
because there is no competitive dynamic to force efficiency in production or
supply." 87 A firm may find internal production an advantageous alternative to
paying those rents.
Fourth, where production of a good or service requires a process relatively
different from those the firm already performs internally, the costs of
developing the capacity to produce that item may exceed the costs of obtaining
it on the open market. 88 If General Motors suddenly needed a different kind of
axle, it likely has skilled staff it could assign to the task; if it suddenly needed
to stage opera performances, its start-up costs would be far more daunting and
an external contract more appealing. Conversely, if the likely outside suppliers
of a good or service would have to develop capacity, with which its staff has
limited expertise to produce a good or service that a firm has been making
internally, the firm may see lower costs by maintaining internal production.
Fifth, as a firm grows past a certain point, the costs of organizing its func89
tions internally may exceed the costs of organizing them through the market.
Expansion typically involves either increasing the range of activities in which
the firm is engaged or increasing the geographic dispersion of those activities;
both create additional managerial challenges. 90 As a firm expands, aggregating
and collating information from its far-flung operations and making appropriate
adjustments for changing conditions affecting their production will become increasingly difficult. 9 1 Moreover, diversification may complicate the task of
finding managers sufficiently competent in its full range of activities.
Allocating resources effectively may become increasingly difficult. The
resources misallocated internally may equal or exceed those wasted on
transaction costs in external procurement. 92 Coase notes that technological
advances improving managers' abilities to supervise remote locations can tilt
the scales in favor of greater internal production. 93

advantageous "where products or services are moderately or highly differentiated, e.g., as with
most services delivered by social welfare agencies"); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 74, at 78295.
86. See RICKETTS, supra note 71, at 18-19.
87. MCCAFFERY & JONES, supra note 82, at 324.
88. See COASE, supra note 70, at 43.
89. See id.
90.
Some see the prototypical entrepreneur as an expert in local markets. See RICKETTS,
supra note 71, at 59.
91.
See COASE, supra note 70, at 43-45.
92. See id. at 43 n.26.
93. Id. at 46. This effect can be counterbalanced if the advance also reduces the costs of
using the price mechanism to organize production. Id.
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Sixth, and related, the firm's command-and-control allocation mechanism
is likely to suffer from agency costs: managers pursuing the best interests of
their particular units at the expense of those of the firm's owners. These agency
costs can be seen as a different type of transaction costs. 94 In addition to having
to determine the best price for the employees and facilities required to produce
the item internally, the firm must oversee managers' work to keep them aligned
with the firm's priorities. The larger the firm, and the less senior managers
(who are closest to ownership) know about lower-level managers' actions, the
greater the agency costs are likely to be.
Seventh, a firm's attitude towards risk can affect the desirability of
producing goods or services it uses internally. 95 Internal production gives a
firm greater ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. 96 Internal production
therefore may be more appealing in cases where significant, difficult-to-foresee
changes are possible. 97 The more factors of production the entity produces
internally, the fewer potential causes of sudden increases in costs. 98 Coase
suggests that internal production will be more appealing for services than for
commodities since the former can vary in many more important dimensions
than the latter. 99 An entity whose output is sold in a market where highly
elastic prices limit its ability to recover sudden cost increases may prefer
internal production for this reason.
Finally, economies of scale'
can help determine whether internal or
external production is most efficient. 101 If economies of scale are apparent at a
much greater level. of production than that required to meet the firm's own
needs, the firm will have to choose between purchasing the item on the open
market, producing it internally at an inefficiently low level, or producing it
internally and selling off the excess. The last may be difficult if other firms
needing the item are competitors that may be reluctant to buy from the firm. 102
If, however, production of the item in question is a natural monopoly with
steadily declining unit costs, the firm may prefer to be that monopolist, but may
succumb if another firm already established itself as the producer. Competition
See Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation,97 MICH. L. REV. 216, 224 (1998).
See COASE, supra note 70, at 39-40; Alan Hughes et al., Hypotheses About Mergers, in
THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 27, 54-56
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1980).
96. See COASE, supra note 70, at 39-40.
97. Even if an external supplier would be indifferent as to which of two possible sets of
specifications it uses, the purchaser may not be able to tell much in advance which of the two it
desires. Id. If the contract specifies one, the supplier is in a position to extract some economic
rents if the purchaser later wishes to switch to the other.
98. RICKETTS, supra note 71, at 47-49.
99. COASE, supra note 70, at 40.
100. Economies of scale occur when the average costs of production fall as the quantity
produced increases. Economies of scale are typically greatest for goods and services whose
production requires large fixed costs.
101. See Hughes et al., supra note 95, at 54.
102. See Levmore, supra note 94, at 228.
94.
95.
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will be unlikely in any event on the open market. 103
Whether a firm chooses to make a good or service internally, or to buy it
on the market, it has additional choices about how to proceed. If the firm elects
to make a factor of production internally, it may either expand its existing
operations or acquire an independent firm that does or can produce that item. If
the firm elects to purchase on the open market, it can purchase through a longterm contract or through a series of short-term contracts. Purchasing on the
open market each time it is needed leaves the organization largely at the mercy
of producers' choices about the design and complicates budgeting. On the other
hand, it offers the maximum benefit of competition. Long-term contracts, joint
ventures, and similar arrangements occupy intermediate positions in both
regards. Accordingly, an automobile manufacturer may decide to open a new
production facility to produce its own steering wheels, to buy out a glass
company capable of making its windshields, to contract with a particular tire
company to supply it for the next several years, and to invite advertising
agencies to bid for its business each time it needs a new campaign. Ignoring
any of these options risks a suboptimal decision.
2. Applying These Factors to Public Benefit Programs
The same factors that determine whether internal organization of
production or resort to the price mechanism is efficient for a firm also
determine the most efficient course for a government agency seeking to obtain
some good or service necessary to carry out one of its programs: internal
production by public employees or purchasing the service in the market. The
one exception may be that mergers and acquisitions are rarely an option for
governments in this country. Even with 04
the power of eminent domain, the
government rarely purchases its suppliers.'
This Subsection applies the economic principles just developed to the
privatization of public benefit programs. Subdivision a considers long-term
contracts with private for-profit or non-profit organizations as an alternative to
having public employees provide the four services in whose performance is
most contested in privatization debates: application assistance, policymaking,
eligibility determination, and dispute resolution. Subdivision b, in turn,
explores the circumstances under which these same four functions can be
purchased on an as-needed basis.

103. See id. at 207-09.
104. The federal government does, however, sometimes contract with state or local
governments to provide services for it on terms where federal policymaking, rather than that of the
entities providing the service, predominates. For example, to reduce the size of the federal
workforce and take advantage of lower state public employees' salaries, the federal government
contracts with state disability determination services (DDSs) to make decisions initially and at the
first level of appeal on applications for Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental
Security Income disability benefits.
HeinOnline -- 96 Cal. L. Rev. 413 2008

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:393

a. Long-Term Contractswith PrivateEntities
One of the main advantages commonly cited for privatization is increased
competition. 10 5 The government, privatizers say, has held a monopoly on
performing these functions for too long. 106 Inviting private contractors to bid
for the right to provide those services is thought likely to drive innovation that
will allow the program to obtain better services for a lower price. The benefits
of competition to government programs should not be taken lightly: in
numerous areas, public-private partnerships have yielded impressive results.
For instance, requiring infant formula companies to compete for the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
produces $1.5 billion per year to serve additional low-income women, infants,
07
and children. 1
Competition for the right to administer a program, however, differs from
competition to provide fungible products in some important respects. These
differences may significantly undermine the value of that competition, particularly when the government commits itself to a long-term contract. The eight
subsections below apply each of the criteria distilled from the theory of the firm
to contracting for the administration of public benefit programs.
i.

Transaction Costs Associated with ContractingPrivateAdministration

Transaction costs are pivotal to the rationale for the firm. Such costs are
similarly central to determinations of what privatization is prudent for public
benefit programs' administration.
Although some transaction costs of contracting are obvious, many are not.
The magnitude of the enterprise requires a massive request for proposals (RFP),
massive proposals from bidders, and massive review teams for the contracting
authority. Each bidder will have to include some allowance for the possibility it
is not selected-and hence that its bidding costs will be wasted-in
determining the price it will charge if selected. The amount of money involved
will require additional costly measures to protect against corruption, and the
chance that those measures may fail creates a risk of devastating scandal.
The transition from public to private administration, or from one
contractor to another, also entails considerable costs. 108 Some investments in
105. See generally Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty
Programs,49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002).
106. See Tim Evans et al., DanielsSet to OK $1B Welfare Plan, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov.
29, 2006, at 1.
107. Zot NEUBERGER & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
WILL THE WIC PROGRAM BE SUFFICIENTLY FUNDED TO SERVE ALL ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS IN
FISCAL YEAR 2008? 4 (2007).

108.
States have encountered serious difficulties when trying to make other sharp changes
in the way they administer other benefit programs analogous to the shift from direct provision of
services to contract management. For example, Medicaid's conversion to managed care required
state health departments to switch from working to prevent the overuse of services to trying to
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equipment, intellectual property, and training will have to be abandoned before
the end of their useful lives. Both the new and old systems must operate
simultaneously while cases are switched over, and a host of compatibility
problems and claimant confusion must be resolved. If the new system cannot
immediately bear the load,09the prior system's life must be extended piecemeal
and possibly at great cost. 1
Uncertainty about bidders' capabilities is perhaps the greatest source of
transaction costs in contracting. At the time the competition takes place, private
bidders generally lack the present capacity to offer those services. No company
rents offices and hires eligibility workers on the chance that it will be selected
to run a program. Thus, the government agency acting on the bids must
essentially speculate about what sort of infrastructure the agency will be able to
build if it wins the bid. That sort of speculation is inherently error-prone, as the
value of any improvements in service and price must be weighed against the
risk that the contractor will be unable to perform as promised.
Designing an RFP that allows the state to award the contract based in part
on its estimates of the likelihood that a particular bidder will develop sufficient
infrastructure is a difficult and time-consuming process, and one that may
increase the likelihood that the final award will become subject to litigation. 110
Yet the risks of not doing so are substantial. For example, many of the notorious problems in military contracting--defective weapons, cost overruns, and so

ensure that managed care contractors did not cut costs by denying services. In a conventional feefor-service system, providers' incentives are to provide as many services as they can, while in
managed care the providers' incentives are reversed. It took nearly a decade for many states to
master the Medicaid managed care contracting process. In the meantime, a host of serious
problems ensued. Some contractors with inadequate financial planning spent their capitation
payments quickly and went bankrupt. This left thousands of Medicaid beneficiaries with no way
to receive care. The unpaid doctors and other care providers became even less willing to treat
Medicaid patients than they had been previously, and some moved out of already-underserved
low-income communities. Other contractors apparently concluded that the turnover among
Medicaid recipients made it cost ineffective to immunize children, even resulting in a measles
epidemic in Milwaukee. Still other plans became adept at "skimming": recruiting Medicaid
beneficiaries likely to require little care while discouraging enrollment by those expected to be
unprofitable.
No one set out to recruit incompetent or irresponsible managed care plans. Nonetheless,
states' experience with fee-for-service care left them ill-equipped to judge when the low-bidding
plans could, and could not, be counted on to provide adequate care. In Medicaid managed care, as
in food stamp administration, no immediate market correction is available since program
recipients cannot walk away from unsatisfactory contractors. Over time, the programs adapted. In
the short term, the losses in both human and financial terms were substantial.
109. Texas, the would-be leader in privatizing Medicaid and food stamp administration,
has had this problem for several years with the new computer system around which it!
privatization plan is built. When assisting people Hurricane Katrina displaced, it had to rely on its
old system because the new one lacked sufficient flexibility. David A. Super, Against Flexibility
33 (forthcoming 2008).
110. See David A. Breaux et al., To Privatization and Back: Welfare Reform
Implementation in Mississippi, in MANAGING

WELFARE

REFORM

CHALLENGE OF DEVOLUTION 43, 47 (Sarah F. Liebschutz ed., 2000).
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forth-result neither from incompetence at the Defense Department nor from
the venality of defense contractors. Instead, they result from the inherent difficulty of predicting a new weapon's capabilities and problems in advance of its
construction and deployment.
ii.

The Difficulty of Specifying in Detailthe Work to be Performed

Administering a public benefit program is multifaceted; changes in both
demographics and policy frequently give rise to new demands. If the
contracting authority cannot properly specify what needs to be done in ways
that are subject to measurement, the electorate will lose substantial value.
Moreover, if the contracting authority fails to anticipate changes that may occur
over the life of the contract, it finds itself locked into a program it may not
want, overpaying for services, or even faced with a collapse in the program's
administration.
Developing specifications subject to accurate measurement is a challenge
endemic to contracts for complex goods and services.
All long-term relationships with private contractors and government
goods and service suppliers rely to some degree on ex ante controls.
• . . But flexible-price, cost-plus type contracts and appropriated
budgets require considerably higher levels of reliance on ex ante
controls and also on monitoring and enforcing
compliance. And the
control is high.
cost of tightly held budget execution
Part of this cost is designing reliable accounting devices to ensure that the
government is charged only for expenses appropriate to its contract. "Still,
accurate accounting does not guarantee efficiency."1 2 A strong accounting
system will show what did happen, but it will not show what might have happened had managers made different decisions. Overseeing contractors'
decisions on complex matters requires government officials to "regulate,
duplicate, or replace the contractor's managerial efforts."" 3 This is costly and
can bring conflict with the contractor, but is essential to counter perverse
14
incentives inherent in such contracts.'
The government will have difficulty measuring contractors' performance
and ensuring quality.'1 5 If an infant formula company delivers expired or
otherwise substandard formula to WIC, the program's managers can promptly
detect the problem and assess a penalty. If the problem persists, the government
111.

MCCAFFERY & JONES, supra note 82, at 329.

112.

Id.

113.
114.

Id.at 330.

See id.; see, e.g., JEFFREY ZORNITSKY & MARY RUBIN, ABT Assocs., ESTABLISHING A
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR TARGETED WELFARE PROGRAMS 37-38 (1988)

(describing agencies' incentives to serve the least disadvantaged individuals to achieve the highest
rates of employment).

115. See generally Robert D. Behn & Peter A. Kant, Strategiesfor Avoiding the Pitfalls of
Performance Contracting,22 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 470 (1999).
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will know and can cancel the contract. The enforcement of contracts of this
kind is easy because the products the government seeks to procure are fairly
straightforward to specify.
By contrast, the quality of public benefit programs' administration is difficult to assess. It entails some relatively objective acts: keeping offices open
during prescribed hours, processing applications and delivering benefits by set
deadlines, and the like. It also involves other activities, such as payment
accuracy, avoiding improper denials, and claims collection. These activities are
measurable, but it may be difficult to agree upon appropriate standards. 116 It
includes some efforts that are almost impossible to quantify, such as providing
accurate responses to eligibility questions, preventing the application process
from discouraging eligible claimants, promoting sound nutrition, and
encouraging increased work effort. At best, a contract may specify some
specific actions the contractor must take in these areas, but that provides no
protection against a contractor whose staff is going through the motions.
Objective contractual terms are most unlikely to provide meaningful guidance
on striking the right balance between competing objectives, such as payment
accuracy and program access.
No program administration, public or private, will excel in all of these
areas. Assessing the quality of program administration is very much a matter of
subjective judgment, weighing deficiencies in some areas against strengths in
others. These assessments typically depend on a wealth of informal communications among various units within the system-a type of communication that
contractors will have strong incentives to control tightly. Even if most
observers would regard a particular contractor's performance as deficient, the
state is unlikely to have objective evidence that is legally sufficient to impose
penalties or to terminate the contract. Absent such evidence, the prospect of
costly and protracted litigation is likely to deter states from even attempting action against contractors. Although automated systems lend themselves far more
readily to objective performance measures than does overall program administration, states have rarely if ever recovered damages from automation
contractors even when systems' catastrophic failures caused huge increases in
error rates and workload for eligibility staff. The difficulty of measuring
performance under contracts to administer Medicaid or food stamps is likely to
prevent states from enforcing most quality assurances the contractors provide.
Competition thus offers little prospect of improving the quality of program
administration or even of allowing states to identify the highest-quality bidder
when getting the contract.
Because contractors will pursue their bottom lines, the government must

116.

See

JANET

M.

KELLY

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

&

WILLIAM

C.

RIVENBARK, PERFORMANCE BUDGETING FOR

174-77 (2003) (describing the arbitrariness of targets for

performance).
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7
find a way to align the contract's payment mechanisms with its priorities."1
Reconciling these objectives is exceedingly complex. Most obviously, although
a lump sum payment will ensure against cost overruns, it will give the
contractor no incentive
to accomplish any particular outcome in its interactions
8
with claimants. 1

Yet this is not the end of the problem. Not only can appropriate
specifications be difficult to craft at the outset of the contracting process, but
also even initially sound specifications may become counter-productive if
circumstances change. For example, Mississippi found that the job placement
measures it established when it first privatized the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) administration failed to work once the more job-ready
recipients had left the program.'19 Because its miscalculation worked to
contractors' disadvantage, they voluntarily abandoned their contracts. 120 In
theory, the state could have held the firms to their contracts, but the political
consequences of assured failure far exceed any windfall the state might have
achieved from the contracts. Had the contractual requirements become much
easier to meet because of changed conditions, the state would have been
obliged to overpay for their services. Hence, contracting under conditions of
great uncertainty for programs in which government officials have a large stake
effectively becomes a one-sided bet, with the state vulnerable to changes in one
direction but unlikely to reap any benefits from changes in the other. 121
iii. The Lack of an On-going Competitive Marketfor Comparable
Administrative Services
Stephen Goldsmith, the former mayor of Indianapolis and a leading champion of privatizing public services, advocates the "Yellow Pages Rule" for contracting: services already available through the Yellow Pages should be the
ones contracted out.' 22 In other words, a market that comes into being purely to
compete for the government's contracts is unlikely to be very competitive.
Even avid privatizers concede that no market exists for many of the services
they wish to consign to the private sector. 123 Thus, the classic type of on-going
117. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Frameworkfor
Corporations Seeking to Deliver Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 199
(2004).
118. See Breaux, supra note 110, at 49.
119. See id. at 53-54.
120. See id.
121.
See Thomas Kaplan, Wisconsin Works, in MANAGING WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE
STATES: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVOLUTION 103, 116 (Sarah F. Liebschutz ed., 2000) (discussing

controversy over welfare contractors' large profits resulting from contracts assuming a much
higher caseload than that remaining after cuts).
122.
Stephen Goldsmith et al., How I Tamed Government, AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 63-64.
123. See generally Douglas J. Besharov, Creating a Marketplace for Social Welfare
Services, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 519 (2002).
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competition that one sees between Ford and GM, between ABC and CBS,
between Coke and Pepsi, etc., is impossible when programs contract out
responsibility for eligibility determinations. In other natural monopolies, like
the provision of gas or cable television services, public operation or public
regulations often have proven necessary to restrain costs. 124 Public benefit
programs can invite genuine competition at the time they let contracts, but
monopoly conditions exist during the life of those contracts. In those periods,
the system will remain as impervious to market signals as it is in the current,
state-run system.
This lack of on-going competition springs in part from economies of scale
that make public benefit programs' administration virtually a natural monopoly,
as explained in Subsection h. It also results from two factors addressed here:
entry barriers resulting from the start-up costs required to undertake that
administrative work and exit barriers making termination of even a deeply
flawed contractor costly for the government. Moreover, contracting on the
uncompetitive market for integrated administrative services is likely to deprive
the government of the opportunity to purchase some components of the needed
services on markets that are competitive.
Administering a public program requires significant, irreducible up-front
expenditures by each new vendor, including the costs of hiring staff, months of
designing policies and procedures for the program and training the new staff in
those policies and procedures, and the time required to rent and furnish offices
before they can be put into use. A company having to hire an entire staff of
people with the intellectual and social skills to learn and implement complex
program policy in a short period of time is likely to have to pay a premium for
that staff or to compromise on quality far more than an agency that only needs
to replace its occasional losses to retirement and attrition. For a contractor to
improve the cost or quality of a program's administration, it will need to
achieve enough new efficiencies to offset these considerable capital costs.
These start-up costs will occur each time a new entity takes over administration of the program.125 Once the state contracts out a program's
administration, the contractor will have a substantial advantage over any
competing bidder (including the former public agency, which by then will have
had to dismantle its administrative infrastructure). This allows the incumbent
contractor to submit a higher bid when the contract comes up for renewal and
124. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in
Generaland with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
125. Much of the best of Texas's staff responsible for determining claimants' eligibility for
public benefits either were laid off or found other work on their own when the state announced
that privatization was imminent. Those that stayed, or that remained available to be called back,
when Texas abandoned its contract presumably had fewer skills to attract other employers. Even if
Texas is able to hire talented new people to replace the ones it lost-an uncertain prospect given
its need to staff up again so quickly-its more senior staff, from which supervisors will be drawn,
has been bled of many of its most talented members.
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still defeat prospective competitors, whose bids will have to cover these startup costs. Indeed, private contractors may increase the start-up costs of public
agencies and other private contractors by requiring their more skilled
employees to sign anti-competition contracts promising not to work for other
vendors in the state for some length of time.
If a contractor providing relatively fungible products, such as WIC infant
formula, fails to perform its contractual obligations, the state has other options
and can consider voiding the contract and seeking new bids. By contrast, if an
administrative services vendor is performing deficiently, the costs and
disruption of selecting a new contractor and having that contractor build up the
infrastructure required to operate the program may leave the state with no other
alternative but to stay with its existing contractor.' 26 If a contractor is
performing so badly that a state feels compelled to seek new bids in the midst
of a contract, other potential bidders will assume that the state is desperate and
likely will set their prices accordingly. Knowing all of this, in turn, may reduce
contractors' incentives to comply fully with their contracts.
This lack of active competition has forced several states to keep
automation contractors whose systems were causing chaos in the administration
of their programs. The states reasoned that switching contractors would cause
considerable disruption and that any new contractor's system might have
comparable problems. The failure of new automation systems caused huge
increases in the food stamp quality control (QC) error rates in Florida, Indiana,
Michigan, and Los Angeles County, among other places. More recently, a
failed computer system has wrought havoc in the Food Stamp Program,
Medicaid, and other social services programs in Colorado for months at a
time. 127 Asking a new contractor to set up a revamped eligibility determination
infrastructure, with different offices, staff, computers, etc. is far more
burdensome than the disruption, cost, and risk of switching automation systems. Therefore, states may feel compelled to stay with administrative
contractors even if their work is far worse than the disastrous automation
systems that states have endured in the past.
Indeed, the government's high costs of shifting from one contractor to
another or rebuilding its administrative infrastructure may prevent it even from
reaping the benefits of the contracts it signed. In particular, the state is extremely vulnerable to contractors' possible bankruptcies. Contractors bid based
on speculation about what administering these programs will cost. Once they
actually rent and furnish offices, hire staff, etc., they may find themselves
significantly under-budgeted. If such a contractor threatens to declare bank126. See Patrice Sawyer, Collection Firm's ContractSet to Expire, CLARION-LEDGER, Aug.
16, 2000, at IA (describing threats of interruptions in child support payments as motivation to
renew contract).
127. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
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ruptcy, and the state judges that threat to be credible, it may have no choice but
to increase its payments to the contractor. 28 Thus, the state effectively must assume most of the risk of the inherent uncertainty about the costs of shifting
administration to a private contractor: if the contract price proves excessive, the
contractor keeps the profits, but if it proves insufficient, the contractor has
leverage to extract an increase. States' inability to avoid such one-sided bets
largely negates any of the benefits from competition.
Contracting with a private firm to administer the Food Stamp Program
also eliminates opportunities for the state to benefit from competition in
providing goods or services for administering programs, such as new
application forms, office space, computer terminals, telephone service, etc. At
present, states regularly take bids for these items and reap the benefits of
competition. By contrast, once the state contracts with a private firm for overall
program administration, it will have to negotiate with that contractor for any
modifications or additions to the program not anticipated in the original
contract. Because no other company can plausibly bid on the work, the contractor will have the leverage to extract a high price from the state. The contractor
may then elect to seek bids from printers, landlords, or other vendors for the
goods or services required to perform the additional work the state wants, but
the savings from that bidding will accrue to the contractor, not the state.
iv. Existing Infrastructure:Similarity with Other Governmental or
Contractors' Functions
One key criterion for determining whether the public or private sector can
more efficiently provide a particular service is determining which one has the
necessary infrastructure. The Food Stamp and WIC Programs rely on private
stores to distribute the food they purchase because these stores already have
effective food purchasing, distribution, and storage systems; the government
would duplicate their investments if it had to build a parallel system for the
food assistance programs. Medicare and Medicaid rely primarily upon private
hospitals, doctors, and other health care providers in part because of the
inefficiency of developing a duplicate health care delivery system. Similarly,
states efficiently contract out data processing for states' eligibility determination systems because private companies have already invested in the massive
servers required to perform that work: a contractor may schedule a batch of
calculations in between similar runs for large corporations or other

128. In the early 1990s, vendors of electronic benefit transfer (EBT) services-debit cardlike systems for delivering welfare payments, child care subsidies, food stamp benefits, and other
aid-negotiated contracts that paid them on a per-transaction basis. Because participation had
been rising rapidly, they assumed these contracts would prove highly advantageous. In actuality,
participation plummeted after 1994 and these contracts proved unprofitable. Some vendors suggested that they might abandon their contracts, putting great pressure on the states and United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to renegotiate these contracts.
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governmental agencies. Early electronic benefit transfer (EBT) demonstration
projects cost far more to deliver food assistance benefits than paper food
stamps; once the private sector developed the infrastructure to support
electronic purchases in grocery stores to serve credit card customers, costs to
the Food Stamp Program plummeted. On the other hand, where the government
already has the necessary infrastructure in place, and where private contractors
have few other present or future uses for that kind of infrastructure, paying to
have the wheel reinvented rarely makes sense.
Although not as conspicuous as state parks or universities, the infrastructure states have developed to administer public benefit programs also reflects a
substantial investment. Selecting, renting, and furnishing offices, developing
policies, forms, and computer systems, hiring, training, and supervising staff,
and myriad other steps are necessary to establish a system for determining
households' food stamp eligibility. Numerous problems arise in administration
that agencies' staff learn to handle by trial and error; that experience represents
an investment. A private contractor could eventually reproduce that infrastructure, but why we should want it to do so is unclear. No economies of scale
are present: the contractor is unlikely to be able to perform work for other customers with the food stamp eligibility determination infrastructure the way
mega-servers handle work for private companies with data processing needs or
stand terminals process non-food stamp customers' credit card purcheck-out
29
chases. 1
v.

Capacityin Which Government Employees Perform Best: Administration
vs. Contract Management

A common argument in favor of privatization is that governmental
managers lack access to the draconian sanctions with which private employers
may motivate their employees to maximize performance. 130 Public
administration experts, however, argue that managers can shape their agencies'
behavior with other tools to train their staffs and reinforce the kinds of behavior
they seek. 13 ' These experts point to the welfare transformations over the past
decade that have removed unprecedented numbers of recipients from cash
assistance programs as evidence32that the culture of even the most entrenched
welfare offices can be changed.
129. Particularly in light of the recent devolution of policy-making authority, the
requirements for operating a program in one jurisdiction is likely to be too different from those in
another to allow contractors to sell the same business model across the country the way a
contractor might sell solid waste removal services to several neighboring communities.
130.

See

NORMA

M.

Riccucci,

How

MANAGEMENT

MATTERS:

STREET-LEVEL

82-84 (2005); JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION
DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 143-46 (1989).
131. See Riccucci, supra note 130, at 86-90.

BUREAUCRATS AND WELFARE REFORM

See LADONNA PAVETTI, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, POLICY BRIEF: THE CHALLENGE
132.
OF ACHIEVING HIGH WORK PARTICIPATION RATES IN WELFARE PROGRAMS 2 (2004).
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More fundamentally, however, whether the government administers
programs itself or contracts them out, public employees will play critical roles.
The key question, then, is which function are they likely to perform best: direct
service or contract administration. The two roles are quite different. Where
previously the government was required to administer the program, now it
becomes responsible for framing requests for bids, negotiating contracts,
monitoring performance, and enforcing compliance. Both administration and
contracting are functions that the government sometimes does well and
sometimes does poorly. The vast majority of government administration and
procurement go well and largely unnoticed. Just as some agencies are accused
of providing shoddy service to the public, so too are other agencies criticized
when they overpay for hammers, toilet seats, and other routine items or when
their contractors provide poor service to the public.
The skills required to administer programs and manage contracts are quite
different. Good administrators must have strong leadership skills and superior
judgment of people. Such administrators must be flexible enough to adapt
rapidly to changing circumstances and problems, and be able to translate policies into instructions their staff can implement. By contrast, getting a sound
contract for program administration requires more analytical skills, including
meticulous attention to detail. Contracting officers must anticipate problems
that have yet to arise because they will not have the flexibility to respond to
them once the contract is signed. Quite different interpersonal skills, such as
negotiating prowess, are necessary to be an effective contract officer.
Contracting offices must also have the ability to translate policies into
contractual specifications that will cause the contractor to act as the agency
intends.
The combination of skills required to be an effective contracting officer is
elusive. Many excellent administrators are ill-equipped to negotiate important
contracts. 133 Alternatively, many people skilled at drafting contracts lack the
operational expertise to anticipate all the contingencies that a contract for
program administration must address. Contracting effectively requires a team,
but even if a state agency has the right combination of talents to make an effective team, the novelty and enormity of the proposed transfer makes
significant problems inevitable: some important aspects of program administration will be taken for granted and some contingencies will not be anticipated.
Designing effective contracts for the administration of Medicaid or the
Food Stamp Program is particularly difficult because it requires
accommodating many different policies that partially conflict. The state
presumably wants eligibility workers to verify applicants' statements about
their income, but not to the point of pestering low-wage workers' employers, or
requiring workers to take so much time off the job that they are fired, denied

133.

See DONAHUE, supra note 130, at 128-29.
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promotions, or discouraged from applying for benefits. States can provide
financial incentives for contractors to achieve one goal or another, but
achieving the right blend of incentives to induce the contractors to strike the
right balance between those objectives-particularly where some, such as
service to low-wage workers, are difficult to measure-may be impossible. At
best, it will require extensive trial and error, with each attempt separated from
the last by several years.
Contract terms must be particularly clear because litigation with
contractors can profoundly disrupt a program's administration. If a state
terminates a contractor that is not performing up to par, the contractor is likely
to sue for the fees it would receive under the remainder of the contract. If the
state misjudged in terminating the contract, or if its lawyers perform badly, the
state could end up having to pay twice for administering the program during the
same period: once to do the work itself (or through another contractor) and
again to the dismissed contractor. No state's budget can readily absorb this kind
of blow. Moreover, states will be unable to plan effectively (and to make longterm hires or enter into any new long-term contracts) during the months or
years required to resolve the litigation. States therefore are likely to be
extremely reluctant to terminate even the worst contractors-and quite eager to
settle any litigation that does arise. As a result, any contractual term that is not
susceptible of very precise measurement is unlikely to be enforced.
Nonetheless, ideological supporters of privatization, or simply officials seeking
to encourage innovation, may limit public managers' ability to structure private
contractors' operations in such a way that they become susceptible to
performance measures.134
The intense demands on public managers do not end with the execution of
a contract. Measuring the quality of contractors' work in several key areas is
exceedingly difficult and error-prone. Eligibility determinations made against
objective criteria can be audited. The quality of assistance with completing the
application process, however, is all but impossible to measure objectively since
it entails complex interpersonal interactions. Surveys of low-income people
who might need the service are likely to lead to misassessments for a host of
reasons: some individuals may not have needed much help while others needed
more help than the contractor was tasked to provide; some may blame the
contractor for their substantive ineligibility while others may assume they are
substantively ineligible when in fact the contractor bungled their case. 135
Other measures of contractors' behavior can be equally problematic. In
some instances, their direct and indirect costs may well outweigh their benefits.
In addition to having substantial costs to implement, measures also may create
134. See Baryl A. Radin, Intergovernmental Relationships and the Federal Performance
Movement, in QUICKER, BETTER, CHEAER? MANAGING PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 285, 286-87 (Dall W. Forsythe ed., 2001).
135. See KELLY & RIVENBARK, supra note 116, at 114-16.
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perverse incentives for the contractor.'36 For example, if the contractor's staff
has trouble communicating with claimants whose primary language is not
English, the contractor could either hire bilingual staff or try to drive away
those claimants before they become part of the set of cases on which the
contractor's performance is measured. Education and training programs may
have the greatest long-term impact on a participant's employability, yet they
invariably result in lower employment in the first half-year than job search or
workfare programs, simply because participants often are still in training at the
six-month mark. Measuring a contractor's success in running a work program
primarily based on participants' employment in the first few months will drive
the contractor to pursue a short-sighted course.
Even where programs' multiple objectives do not conflict, program
managers have had difficulty finding measures of quality that are both
meaningful and clear enough to be enforceable. Proprietary child care centers
designed to operate on government subsidies have had persistent quality
problems. 137 Inducing staff to allocate time among several components of their
jobs requires managers to establish a performance monitoring system that
provides equal marginal rewards
for each of those activities when the optimum
38
allocation has been reached. 1
In addition, the proxies for performance on which most metrics rely
introduce their own sources of error.1 39 A contractor that induces claimants to
make a large number of job contacts may appear to be promoting selfsufficiency effectively, but if the claimants are pursuing jobs for which they are
manifestly unqualified, or are so hurried that their applications are perfunctory,
nothing constructive is accomplished. Although many credit outcome measures
as freeing public administration from the rigidity of procedural rules, 140 most
favorable and unfavorable outcomes of human services programs have multiple
causes; determining whether the program's administration is responsible is
commonly impossible.1 41 If food stamp recipients experience more food
insecurity than other low-income people, is that because the program is failing
or because their pre-existing food insecurity drove them to apply for food
stamps? A related concern is that legal, ethical, and financial constraints may
limit the contractor's ability to change outcomes. 142 Lifetime disqualification of
claimants that miss appointments is likely to increase the efficiency of

136. See id. at 145.
137. See GEORGE T. MARTIN, JR., SOCIAL POLICY IN THE WELFARE STATE 181-83 (1990)
[hereinafter MARTIN, SOCIAL POLICY].
138. See Gerald Marschke, The Economics of Performance Incentives in Government with
Evidence from a Federal Job Training Program, in QUICKER, BETTER, CHEAPER? MANAGING
PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 61, 72-77 (Dall W. Forsythe ed., 2001).

139.
140.
141.
142.

See MARTIN, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 137, at 146.
See, e.g., ZORNITSKY & RUBIN, supra note 114, at 34-36.
See MARTIN, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 137, at 146-47.
See id. at 147.
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scheduling eligibility workers' time, but it is unacceptable for moral and (in
most programs) legal reasons. One-on-one instruction in interviewing
technique would no doubt improve claimants' success in obtaining
employment, but even the most efficiently run contractors are unlikely to be
able to afford that. Designing performance objectives that contractors can meet,
but are not assured of doing so, is exceedingly difficult, 143 particularly because
the very fact of contracting out aspects of the program's operations changes the
nature of the program.
All of these problems, of course, apply also to senior government
managers trying to measure their own subordinates' work. 14 4 But because
managers' discretionary internal directives to their staffs do not have to sustain
the kind of legal scrutiny that assertions of contractual non-performance do,
they are free to rely on a broader range of measures of performance, including
some quite subjective ones. Performance measurement within an organization
is less likely to be so adversarial as to be counterproductive-the way it can be
between a government agency and a contractor that could face sanctions or
termination for negative outcomes. 145 The very civil service protections
commonly blamed for slowing change when deficiencies are detected also can
give employees enough sense of security not to obstruct attempts to identify
and measure those shortcomings. Even if one or two individual government
employees might face reassignment or even dismissal for particularly bad
results, most employees in a unit are likely to survive. By contrast, a private
firm that loses an important contract may lay off most or all of the employees
hired to carry out that contract.
Conversely, many obstacles to improving the public sector may be littlechanged in the private sector. A lack of resources to pay enough to attract and
retain qualified employees is likely to carry over once an activity is contracted
out. 14 6 If the government agency lacks the analytical and decision-making
capacity to act on problematic performance data, 147 it is likely to have at least
as much difficulty identifying and acting on deficiencies in a contractor's
behavior.
vi. Agency Costs ofPublic andPrivateAdministration

In some important respects, contractors' performance may be inherently
more difficult to assess and improve than that of government employees
providing similar services. The greater heterogeneity of contractors may make

143. See id. at 154-58, 174-77.
144. See Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 51, at 1117-29.
145.
See KELLY & RiVENBARK, supra note 116, at 179.
146. Id. at 179. This may be less true if the problem was a rigid government pay scale that
would not apply to a contractor. Nonetheless, even in that case, the contractor is likely to require
more resources to achieve equivalent results.
147. Id. at 178-79.
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comparison of performance data from different locations less helpful in
identifying problematic performers. 148 Public managers also can pursue continuous improvement in their agencies' processes. 149 Improvement in processes
contracted out may be concentrated around the time the contracts come up for
renewal. If the government switches to a different contractor, many of the lessons its predecessor learned may be lost.
vii. Risk Avoidance
Transferring responsibility to a new entity entails risks both in the
transition and over the long term if the contractor proves not to be up to the
task. Our willingness to contract out a function depends in significant part on
our tolerance for risk that that function will be performed badly. Decisions
about whether to contract out administration of Medicaid and food stamps to
companies currently lacking the necessary infrastructure therefore implies in
part a willingness to contemplate those contractors failing and leaving many
eligible low-income families without access to health care or food aid for some
period of time.
viii. Economies of Scale
Critics argue, in effect, that public agencies suffer diseconomies of
scale. 150 Whatever the merits of this contention in other contexts, it would seem
to have little application to the administration of public benefit programs.
Indeed, a strong case can be made that administration of these programs is a
natural monopoly. The overhead required to maintain facilities, develop
policies and procedures, train staffs, etc., make it uneconomical for multiple
entities-the state and a private contractor or more than one contractor-to
operate eligibility determination systems simultaneously. States seeking to
privatize tacitly admit this when they seek bids only for sole-source
administrative contracts. This argument therefore provides no basis for
distinguishing between public and private administration. Moreover, as the next
subsection shows, efforts to escape these asserted diseconomies of scale with
smaller purchases of administrative services raise several serious issues in
addition to most of the same problems that afflict sole-source privatization.
b.

PurchasingServices As Needed

The method of obtaining goods and services that would seem to offer the
greatest promise of competition is to purchase those items from the vendor

148.
149.
PROGRAMS:
150.

See id. at 164 (describing the increasing popularity of this approach).
See id. at 158-61; see also PETER M. KETTNER ET AL., DESIGNING
AN EFFECTIVENESS-BASED APPROACH 126-53 (1990).

AND MANAGING

See, e.g., J. PETER GRACE, BURNING MONEY: THE WASTE OF YOUR TAX DOLLARS

85-87 (1984).
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offering the best deal when that service is needed. To be sure, negotiating a
single long-term contract may entail fewer transaction costs than arriving at
numerous short-term contracts. 15 Purchasing services as needed, however,
maintains continuous competitive pressure on all vendors and brings
innovations into play as soon as they become available.
Some privatization proposals for public benefit programs purchase
administrative services as needed, particularly the service of assisting
applicants with preparing applications and occasionally that of making
eligibility decisions. 52 USDA has announced plans for a pilot program in
Illinois in which low-income households could apply for the equivalent of food
stamps at emergency food providers, who could approve up to 45 days of
benefits while sending them to regular food stamp offices for on-going aid.
H&R Block has explored various arrangements under which it would determine
families' eligibility for food stamps when it prepares their tax returns. Although
the pending privatization plans in Texas, Indiana, and several other states
revolve around a single contractor whom the state would assign to assist
households with making applications, it also has sought to enlist non-profit
community groups to provide additional free help to applicants needing more
than the contractor is prepared to provide. 153 Most significantly several states,
including Florida and Kansas, have closed many of their local offices, leaving
prospective claimants largely on their own for obtaining help with the
application process.
Privatization of this sort is already taking place in some programs. On a
small scale, community health centers and disproportionate share hospitals
(DSHs) may take Medicaid applications and make "presumptive" (temporary)
54
decisions concerning the eligibility of certain pregnant women and children.
The management of each low-income housing project subsidized under Section
8 takes applications and makes eligibility decisions (including the maintenance
of their own waiting lists). In each case, however, only a modest share of
claimants apply through the private entities.
Four major public benefit programs that rely on individual purchases of
application assistance are Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), Supple151.
See COASE, supra note 70, at 39.
152.
One could characterize the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) notice and
comment rule-making procedures as a means of allowing members of the public to compete on an
issue-by-issue basis for policymaking responsibilities. Although some agencies hire private firms
to draft manuals or regulations, the complexity of the interrelationships among the provisions of
these documents generally has deterred them from obtaining these services on a piecemeal basis.
And Medicare has private fiscal intermediaries resolve some claimants' disputes. See Grijalva v.
Sullivan, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated sub noma. Shalala v. Grijalva, 526 U.S. 1096
(1999) (describing this role and finding aspects of it unconstitutional).
153.
Some have suggested having non-profit community organizations compete with
public agencies by setting up parallel systems, with claimants free to choose where to apply. See
infra Part B.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(55) (2000).
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mental Security Income (SSI) disability benefits, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), and Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL). In SSDI and SSI, claimants may
retain an attorney or another representative or may forego paid assistance and
go through the application process themselves. Similarly, individuals may hire
commercial tax preparers to help them file for EITC or may attempt to do so
themselves.1 55 GSL applicants must apply through a financial institution but
have a wide choice among institutions. The experiences of each of these
programs are instructive.
Purchasing administrative services as needed is an alternative to internal
governmental production of those services. As such, the "make-or-buy"
decision would depend on the same factors developed in the two preceding
sections. This section explores some additional major issues that would have to
be resolved to privatize components of public benefit programs' operations by
purchasing services on an as-needed basis. Subsection i addresses the problem
of which of the two consumers of administrative services-the claimants that
receive the services, and seek to establish their eligibility for the underlying
benefit, or the government that authorizes the program-should make the
purchasing decisions. The nature and terms of the competition will differ
considerably depending on who is selecting the winners. Subsection ii
considers how the designated purchaser will obtain enough information about
providers to make an intelligent selection. If purchasing decisions do not reflect
the relative performances of the vendors, the value of competition will be lost
or distorted. Subsection iii explores the issues of cost: whether paying for administrative services separately from benefits is likely to increase or decrease
total costs. Subsection iv probes the impact of this competition on programs'
integrity. Finally, subsection v identifies key design features that facilitate some
programs' privatization of administration in this manner. It argues that those
features significantly impede the programs' substantive missions and as such
would be unwise to replicate in other programs.
i.

Determining Who Will Act as Purchaser

In most instances where a commodity is purchased on an as-needed basis,
the purchasing agent's identity is obvious. That is not necessarily the case with
some services in public benefit program administration. Both claimants and the
government have interests in the goods and services purchased because the
program separates financing and consumption. For example, recipients of food
assistance have an interest in obtaining something appealing to eat; the

155. In SSI and EITC, legal services offices and Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
services respectively provide some free legal service. (Congressional restrictions on legal services
offices' taking potentially fee-generating cases have largely eliminated free representation for
SSDI claimants since 1995.) In neither case, however, is the supply or extent of free assistance
remotely sufficient to meet the needs of all claimants or even those claimants with the greatest
need.
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government has a fiscal interest in restraining the price and perhaps a
paternalistic interest in the food purchased providing enough nutritional value
to justify the program's cost. One or the other, participant or the government,
must make the final purchasing decision. Potential providers of goods or
services therefore have reason to compete only in those dimensions that will
appeal to whichever one will decide on a purchase. This will require the
government to decide in which sphere it seeks competition and to accomplish
its objectives in the other through command-and-control means, if at all.
This tension over whether the claimant or the government is the purchaser
has been resolved in varying ways. Public housing programs select architects
and construction companies; those companies have no incentive to consider
potential residents' satisfaction except to the extent that the housing authority's
rules impose minimum standards; competition occurs exclusively on the basis
of price, schedule, and other matters important to the housing authority. The
Food Stamp Program, on the other hand, allows recipients largely unfettered
market choice: apart from prohibiting purchases of a few items that arguably
are not food and prohibiting some kinds of exceptionally uneconomic
transactions, USDA largely allows recipients to expend the benefits allotted to
them. USDA limits the dollar value of purchases by each household, giving
recipients an interest in low prices. Food vendors do not, however, have any
incentive to compete on matters of paternalistic concern to the USDA or to
restrain practices that capitalize on information failures afflicting recipients but
not the government. 156
Purchases of eligibility determination services raise even more vexing
issues. Where the government offers limited help in completing the application
process, claimants have the choice of attempting to negotiate that process
themselves or expending some of their prospective benefit to purchase those
services from private vendors. With claimants deciding whether to purchase
any services at all, and if so from whom, competition focuses on them, not the
government agency. Thus, competition is likely to occur over price, perceived
effectiveness in securing the benefit, and customer service. Competition will
not occur over matters important to the government, such as integrity of the
service provided by the vendor. In fact service providers will then be able to
156. Nutritional information that misleads claimants, but that would not have misled the
USDA's nutritionists, may induce recipients to spend their food stamps. Occasionally, elaborate
arrangements may allow some limited competition in both spheres. In WIC, food manufacturers
and retailers must market to both government and recipient: the government applies nutritional
standards to strictly limit the kinds of foods that participants may obtain with vouchers and awards
exclusive contracts to provide some foods, notably infant formula, to low bidders. Within these
constraints, participants choose where and precisely what to buy. This effort to bifurcate
competition has not been without its problems. Although competitive bidding effectively limits
the wholesale price of infant formulas, retailers have competed for the patronage of price-indifferent consumers by offering exquisite service and free merchandise while taking monumental
mark-ups. See generally Zod NEUBERGER & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, WIC-ONLY STORES AND COMPETITIVE PRICING IN THE WIC PROGRAM (2004).
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profit from information failures (e.g., claimants' misperceptions of their
effectiveness in securing benefits or of their fees for these services relative to
the market-concerns that would not have afflicted the government.) The
government can attempt to influence these factors by setting minimum
standards for the service providers with which it will interact. In practice,
however, many providers of application assistance can operate effectively
without directly interacting with the government.
As a general matter, requiring private entities to simultaneously
accommodate two sets of demands-here, from the government and
participants-is likely to prove inefficient. Although this is particularly true
where the division of control over purchasing decisions between the two is
unclear, concern about the inefficiency of dual regulation has led the courts to
find local and state regulation preempted, respectively, by state and federal
laws, even where no express conflict exists. 157
ii. Information Problems
Competition for business in providing assistance in the application
process will produce efficient results only to the extent that those making
purchasing decisions have sufficient information to differentiate among
potential vendors' integrity and effectiveness. If the purchaser is the state, the
problems with purchasing these services on an as-needed basis approximate
those discussed above pertaining to long-term contracts. Indeed, if the state
picks a single vendor, the functions would be substantially identical. If, instead,
the state maintains a list of vendors whose services it would reimburse and
allows claimants to select among them, both the state and claimants will need
information to make their respective choices. And if the state leaves the
selection of vendors entirely up to claimants, the competition's effectiveness
will depend entirely on claimants' having sufficient information to make
elections that serve their interests.
Assuming that claimants have either constrained or unconstrained choices
among providers, two questions are likely to arise: which factors are likely to
be important in making their choices, and how easily accessible information
about those factors is to claimants. Presumably, one consideration will be the
vendor's rate of success in obtaining benefits and its effectiveness in securing
relatively large awards. Where the vendors are competing to provide eligibility
determinations, even provisional ones, the government may have a strong
interest in obstructing the flow of this information: vendors competing over
their success in extracting money from the government may tempt them to aid
157. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (applying a presumption that Congress seeks to avoid parallel federal and state regulation
of the same activity even when the two regulatory schemes do not conflict); In re Generic
Investigation into Cable Television Servs., 707 P.2d 1155, 1161 (N.M. 1985) (finding state
regulation sufficiently comprehensive to imply preemption of local authority).
HeinOnline -- 96 Cal. L. Rev. 431 2008

CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 96:393

their clients in unethical ways and may lead to "creaming"-selecting only
clients with simple, winning claims who may not actually need their
assistance-a practice that allows little access to vendors' services for those
claimants with less obviously meritorious claims. Even if the service at issue is
merely application completion, the government may fear the risks of fraud
should it help claimants reward providers based on their success rate. Yet the
government's withholding of information on vendors' true effectiveness will
not stop some from advertising claims that claimants have little capacity to
appraise.
Another obvious criterion claimants use in selecting a vendor is cost.
Where the government reimburses vendors or issues a standardized price schedule, claimants will have no incentive to select on the basis of cost. Yet, even
where a genuine consumer price difference exists, competition may be
unavailing. Without an intimate understanding of the eligibility determination
process, claimants may have difficulty determining the adequacy or
comprehensiveness of the package of services a vendor is offering at a given
price. A vendor with a low initial price may be a bad deal if it charges extra to
resolve many kinds of problems that routinely arise in the application process.
Claimants' lack of information leaves vendors to compete largely on
various aspects of convenience. In some instances, these will be significant. For
example, public human services offices are often located in remote or
dangerous areas, in order to take advantage of low property values. Moreover,
although increasing numbers of public human services offices maintain early,
late, or weekend hours to accommodate low-wage workers, one can readily
imagine private vendors offering longer hours. Although civil rights laws
require agencies to accommodate both persons with disabilities and linguistic
minorities, vendors could plausibly provide better accommodations,
particularly if they specialize. Information about each of these factors is
relatively inexpensive to disseminate and easy to interpret. Other elements of
convenience-the clarity and courtesy of communication by a vendor's staff,
waiting times, the number of visits required to complete the process-may be
difficult for claimants to measure in advance and indeed difficult to standardize
across any given vendor's operations. Competition, then, seems unlikely to
improve vendors' performance much in those regards. An important question,
then, is whether the benefits of competition in reducing these sorts of
transaction costs outweigh the transaction costs of having claimants purchase
these services incrementally.
In practice, generating meaningful competition has proven difficult. For
example, both the government and beneficiaries participate in selecting vendors
in the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, with the government playing a weak
role. Many financial institutions vie for students' business, with few regulatory
constraints on entering the market. In practice, this broad choice is narrowed
because many universities promulgate lists of "preferred" lenders, from which
HeinOnline -- 96 Cal. L. Rev. 432 2008

2008]

PRIVA TIZA TION AND THE POOR

most students select. Thus, much of the competition among lenders is to get on
as many of these lists as possible. The result is that vendors are competing in
ways that benefit neither the program's financial supporter, the government,
nor its student consumers. Even apart from the role of universities in skewing
the competition, it is unclear what important values the competition among
lenders could be hoped to advance: rates and eligibility rules are standardized
(and must be) to meet the government's budgetary constraints, risk is largely
eliminated by the government's guarantee, and procedures for pressing
delinquents to pay also are standardized to prevent unnecessary defaults from
draining the government's coffers. Perhaps some lenders are more courteous or
expeditious than others, but this hardly seems a matter of such importance as to
require the government to bear the considerable transaction costs of the private
system. Skepticism that this competition would result in either reduced costs or
improved services led Congress to expand direct student loans in 1993, moving
back toward governmental provision.
The new Medicare prescription drug benefit also relies on a dual selection
model, with claimants choosing from a list of authorized providers.
Beneficiaries are required to select among competing private firms for
assistance in applying for the benefit, for eligibility determinations, for issuance
of the benefit, and for some policymaking. Low-income Medicare beneficiaries
seeking subsidies for the program's substantial cost-sharing requirements also
may choose whether to apply at state human services offices or through the
Social Security Administration. As the new prescription drug benefit moves
toward implementation, Medicare beneficiaries have expressed considerable
confusion and frustration about the difficulty of determining which vendor
offers the best deal.
iii. The Costs ofAssistance with the Application Process
The costs of administering public benefit programs inevitably are divided
between claimants and the government. This becomes apparent from an
examination of the steps required to comply with the requirements of tax or
public benefit programs' rules. 158 Potential claimants must learn about the program's requirements, keep records of information relevant to their eligibility,
and prepare the application or return. 159 Claimants bear some of these costsrecord keeping and at least part of the costs of learning a program's rules and

158. See JAMES L. PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS: THE BURDENS OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 17
(1993).
159. Id. In tax systems, they also may need to change their practices to meet the requirements of specific tax expenditures. Id. Similar planning may be required in public benefit
programs involving large amounts of money, such as Medicaid for long-term care. In many other
programs, complying with behavioral requirements, such as making a required number of job
contacts or seeing mandatory videos, imposes a somewhat analogous burden and raises the cost of
applying. See Super, Invisible Hand,supra note 28, at 825-30.
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completing its application-in many programs. 16 For example, EITC
claimants bear virtually all the costs of applying.' 61 The IRS has no system of
local offices to help claimants apply, to answer their questions about the
program's rules, or to examine verification of their eligibility. Apart from very
limited help it provides over the telephone, the IRS leaves claimants to prepare
their returns themselves, to spend a portion of their benefits on commercial tax
preparation assistance, or, if they are fortunate, to find a free charitable return
preparer, commonly through the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) program.
SSDI and SSI disability determinations involve a somewhat more limited
version of claimant-selected privatized administration. Claimants' representatives-often, but by no means always, lawyers-will help claimants apply for
benefits, gather medical evidence, and present that evidence to SSA's adjudicators. This form of private administration is supplemental: SSA will, by itself,
perform all necessary functions for the claimants. SSDI and SSI claimants
presumably hire representatives if they believe that SSA will not provide
adequate or fair administration. Many do, even though the cost is high: an
applicant's representatives can obtain up to one-third of any retroactive SSDI
162
payments a claimant receives when SSA ultimately approves her application.
In cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid, the government
traditionally has borne the costs of helping claimants complete applications.
Typically, the agencies operating these programs receive funding for benefit
costs and administration separately. 163 Where private vendors compete to
provide administrative services on an as-needed basis, however, the choice of
how to allocate administrative costs is less obvious. The government can decide
to continue paying those costs. To retain budgetary control, this presumably
would require a standardized price schedule. Such a schedule, however, would
eliminate any competition as to price. Alternatively, the government can leave
payment for administration to claimants, as it does for the EITC, SSDI, and
SSI.

In some states, Medicaid is a partial exception to this. By accepting claimants' self160.
attestation as to their incomes and following up with computer matching, agencies largely lift the
burden of record-keeping from claimants.
161.
Indeed, the entire tax system could be considered a very large means-tested program
that leaves in private hands the task of submitting applications. Its numerous tax expenditures are
available only to persons that "apply" for them successfully.
162.
SSI claimants also may retain representatives. In practice, however, few are able to do
so because SSA's regulations do not allow attachment of retroactive SSI awards. The same is true
of SSDI recipients whose eligibility SSA is redetermining: without a lump sum to be diverted,
representatives have been reluctant to take cases. Representation is rare in cash assistance, food
stamp, and Medicaid cases not involving large payments for institutional care.
163. TANF allows states to spend up to fifteen percent of their block grants on
administration. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (2000). A variant on this approach is WIC, which allocates
roughly twenty-five percent of its funds for the combination of administration and one segment of
program benefits: nutrition education. Id. § 1786(d)(3).
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This latter approach to privatization raises several issues. Most obviously,
requiring claimants to purchase administrative services will result in a
significant number becoming even more impoverished after interacting with
the public benefit program than they would have been had they not interacted
in the first place. Budgetary constraints cause programs' eligibility rules to
deny aid to many indisputably needy claimants. 164 Few claimants that purchase
application assistance have sufficient knowledge of the eligibility rules to
recognize their probable ineligibility. If they did, they likely would apply on
their own or not apply at all. Thus, unless the private administrative vendor
operates on a contingency basis, unsuccessful claimants paying those vendors'
fees would be significantly worse off for having applied for benefits than they
would be had the program not existed. The notion that an anti-poverty program
could exacerbate poverty is disquieting.
Shifting administrative costs to claimants also distorts political decisionmaking. Public benefit programs inevitably have both benefit and
administrative costs. The administrative costs of application assistance exist
whether the government hires or contracts with staff to provide that assistance
or leaves claimants to purchase that assistance on their own. Thus, programs
like EITC and SSDI provide smaller net benefits than their gross amounts
might suggest because claimants must bear the cost of that assistance themselves. 165 The question then arises which is the most efficient way of paying for
those costs: through separate government appropriations or as an implicit component of gross benefit costs. If the cost of the two approaches was equivalent,
a political argument could be made that the electorate may be more willing to
set aside money for benefits than for administration. Thus, instead of spending
$9 on benefits and $1 on administration, the electorate might be disposed to
spend somewhat more than $10 on benefits in the absence of a separate
administrative line.' 66 On the other hand, misleading the electorate to believe

164.

See, e.g., H.

COMM.

ON WAYS

& MEANS,

2000 GREEN

BOOK:

BACKGROUND

MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS

AND MEANS 381-82, 1284 (Comm. Print 2000) (showing that the maximum cash assistance grant
in every state is far below the federal poverty line).
165.
Even when a worker prepares her own tax return, or represents herself in a disability
determination, she bears a cost in the form of an increased risk of an incorrect, unfavorable
eligibility determination.
166. One of President Reagan's first acts was to freeze civil service hiring in most agencies. Robert W. Hartman, Federal Employee Compensation and the Budget, in THE FEDERAL
BUDGET: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 263, 266 (Aaron Wildavsky & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1982).

Congress, too, has imposed crude caps on federal employment. Id. Far from achieving their
professed goal of increased efficiency, personnel caps absent a reduction in the work expected
have forced agencies to contract for basic government functions whether doing so was costeffective or not. Id. Also, by treating costly professionals and inexpensive clerical staff
equivalently, caps tend to encourage managers to skew the federal workforce toward the former.
Id. at 266-67. This antipathy toward public employment crosses partisan lines: the Clinton
Administration treated reductions in the size of the federal workforce as one of the chief
accomplishments of its "reinventing government" initiative. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra
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the gross amount of benefits is available to meet recipients' needs is likely to
cause the public to question a program's efficacy: it may wonder why
recipients are not doing as well as their gross benefit levels suggest they should
be. 167
168
The reduction in recipients' purchasing power could be considerable.
SSA will withhold up to one-quarter of retroactive SSDI (but not SSI) benefits

to pay the fees of representatives.' 6 9 It also authorizes its adjudicators to
determine the propriety of the fee the representative charges in each case. Solid
data is unavailable on the amount of the fees approved; certainly if they
approach one-third of retroactive benefits, they could make SSDI and SSI's
total administrative costs (including SSA's internal costs of limited application
assistance and adjudication of claims) substantially greater as a proportion of
benefits than those for Medicaid and food stamps. 170 This may be appropriate
given the complexity of disability determinations, but it provides no basis for
predicting that privatizing application assistance would produce savings in
other programs. In SSDI continuing eligibility review and SSI cases, fees
appear lower and more difficult to collect (without the ability to collect from
retroactive SSDI awards), with representation less widely available.
note 9, at 1305.
The example in the text is, of course, oversimplified. Even programs that do not provide the
extent of application assistance that welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid customarily have done
still have significant administrative costs.
167. See Super, Political Economy, supra note 6, at 704 (analyzing distortions resulting
from programs that appear to be available to more people, or to provide more benefits, than is the
case).
To be sure, inter-program differences provide evidence of costs from programs that
168.
purchase application assistance on an as-needed basis, but cannot provide direct evidence of what
those costs would be in programs that now maintain a staff to provide application assistance. On
the one hand, applications for food stamps and Medicaid are likely to be significantly simpler than
the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) disability determinations. On the other hand, many
successful applicants in these two programs must reapply and navigate an eligibility re-determination process sooner than those in programs relying on private application assistance. See 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2012(c), 2014(c) (2000) (requiring most food stamp households to file reports at least every six
months and to undergo full eligibility reviews at least every twelve months). GSL and EITC
operate on annual eligibility determinations; SSI conducts financial reviews annually but it and
SSDL typically review disability status much less often.
California, Illinois, and a few other states pay some community-based organizations flat fees,
commonly $50, for each Medicaid and SCHIP application they prepare and submit. Because these
groups have altruistic motives for helping low-income people apply, however, this does not
demonstrate that $50 is sufficient to attract for-profit firms to provide such aid or that it funds
sufficient staff to make this assistance available to all prospective claimants in need, even in the
areas these non-profits serve. Moreover, these arrangements currently operate in addition to the
traditional public application assistance and eligibility determination structure. If that structure
was dismantled, the task of assisting claimants to apply for these programs would become
considerably more demanding.
169. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1730(b)(1)(i) (2007).
170. Good data also is unavailable on the typical amount of retroactive benefits accrued
when a represented claimant finally prevails. Obviously this fee arrangement gives claimants'
representatives incentives to proceed somewhat slowly.
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EITC claimants spend an estimated $1.75 billion per year out of their $30
billion credits to purchase services very similar to those performed by food
stamp eligibility workers.'
Although substantial, this represents only a
fraction of the program's total administrative costs. The IRS spends additional
funds processing the tax returns (essentially applications) that claimants submit.
The IRS also maintains a telephone service to try to answer claimants'
questions. Moreover, the IRS backloads substantial costs of EITC eligibility
determination. Initially, the taxpayer, often aided by a tax preparer, determines
her own eligibility. Subsequently, however, the IRS audits returns, demands
additional documentation,
and pursues a variety of costly and intrusive
72
collection mechanisms. 1
This approach also has substantial non-monetary costs. The criteria on
which the IRS selects returns to be audited are highly controversial, fraught
with accusations of favoritism, racism, and political retaliation. 173 The perception that these factors taint program administration has a significant nonmonetary cost to the electorate, which cannot feel as satisfied with a program
operating under such a cloud. The IRS's back-end administration of EITC also
has a substantial economic cost. In 1995 President Clinton proposed and
Congress enacted an extra $100 million per year targeted specifically on
auditing EITC claimants, in addition to substantial fractions of its general audit
and compliance funds. 174 As a result, although the amounts of money at stake
are far smaller, the IRS audits more than twice as high a percentage of the
returns of low-income EITC claimants than it does the returns of partnerships
or of persons making over $100,000.175 This high rate of audits surely
contributes to the large and steadily increasing share of EITC claimants
surrendering a significant fraction of their potential benefits to professional tax
176
preparers.
Finally, the impact of leaving claimants to purchase application assistance
in a public benefit program depends not just on the incidence and amount of
those costs but also on how those costs are distributed within the population of
claimants. Claimants will have to choose, not just which provider to use, but
whether to sacrifice some of their prospective award on any provider at all.
This method of privatization appears likely to produce a significantly regressive
distribution. Some of the neediest eligible claimants, who feel they cannot
afford to pay for an administrative service provider, may be denied benefits
based on the incompleteness of their applications. These lost benefits
171.

DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX

SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH-AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE

172.

141 (2003).

See PAYNE, supra note 158, at 35-85.

173. See DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF:
260-62, 267-69, 276-77, 313 (1989).
174. JOHNSTON, supra note 171, at 132.
175. Id. at 134-35.
176. See PAYNE, supra note 158, at 28, 154.
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effectively represent an administrative cost, even if they are not received by
any vendor.
In addition, the least sophisticated claimants are likely to need the most
assistance negotiating the application process.177 These unsophisticated
individuals are likely to be disproportionately the poorest and, hence, those on
whom denial of a meritorious claim is likely to create the greatest hardship.
Moreover, these claimants may be the least effective at selecting competent
representatives or at negotiating competitive fees with the representatives they
do select.
In all of these respects, even if a shift to recipients' purchase of
application assistance did not reduce aggregate net benefits available to
claimants, it likely would shift those benefits from the most to the least
vulnerable. This seems inconsistent with the goals of a means-tested program.
iv. Impacts of Privatizationon ProgramIntegrity and Design: Lessonsfrom
the EITC
Privatization has varying effects on the integrity of public benefits
programs. For example, EITC claimants determine not just whether to pay for
any administrative services at all, but also which services to purchase: return
preparation, tax advice, and/or risk advice.' 78 Different tax preparers may
provide these services in varying degrees. Future claimants under privatized
Medicaid or food stamp application processes will likely face a similar array of
choices.
These choices are important. IRS research shows some variation in
taxpayer compliance with program requirements based on how the return was
prepared. The most reliable returns appear to be those that taxpayers prepare
for themselves, followed by those prepared by attorneys. 179 National tax
preparation chains were about average, with local tax services and informal
paid preparation producing the most problematic results.180 This may reflect
the fact that some tax preparers combine the functions performed in other
programs by eligibility workers and by dishonest friends.
Because claimants determine who will perform important EITC
administrative functions for them, tax preparation firms naturally advertise.
Some service providers may find it advantageous to maintain reputations for
integrity and to minimize disputes with the IRS. As a result, these firms may

177. See DAVID STREET ET AL., THE WELFARE INDUSTRY: FUNCTIONARIES AND
RECIPIENTS IN PUBLIC AID 67-69, 74-91 (1979).
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: VOLUME 1: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 171 (Jeffrey A.
178.
Roth et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE VOL. I].
See id. at 173. These figures are for all taxpayers, not just those claiming the EITC.
179.
Since the data does not control for income level or the complexity of the return, it is only suggestive. See id. at 175.
180. See id. at173.
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actually understate the claimant's EITC, or overstate her tax liability.' 8 1 This
serves the program's interest in integrity but undercuts its interest in aiding
eligible claimants to the full extent of the law. Other service providers may promote themselves on the basis of their supposed ability to maximize the
taxpayer's refund. 182 They may pursue risky or even overtly unlawful schemes
to maintain this image. Here again, one program objective may be served at the
expense of another. Still other providers may seek to compete on the basis of
price. To keep unit costs down, these preparers may cut corners resulting in
errors in both directions. Overall, although the tax preparation market appears
quite competitive, it is difficult to see how this competition reliably advances
the program's goals.
Commodification of program administration can have other effects that
are more difficult to measure. Research indicates that personal integrity and a
commitment to social fairness plays a major role in encouraging taxpayers'
compliance.1 83 The IRS seeks to promote the public's esteem for the tax
system's fairness (and hence worthiness of compliance) through program
information activities, which seek to aid low-income taxpayers.'1 84 Contact with
a public eligibility worker, who explains program rules and the importance of
compliance' 85 could heighten this sense of civic duty in public benefit
186
programs.
EITC's history of "perceived" integrity problems should be caution
against heedless emulation of its administrative model. A series of reports have
criticized the EITC's high error rate. 187 Yet, without eligibility workers to
interview claimants, the IRS has no reliable way of knowing, in any particular
case, whether errors result from honest misunderstandings of the program's
rules
and how many represent deliberate fraud. Overall, however, IRS and
General Accounting Office (GAO) reports suggest that the vast majority of
discrepancies in the EITC result from honest errors rather than fraud.' 89
Although some tax preparation firms have relatively low error rates,
others do quite badly. Some claimants try to file on their own, but they may

181. Id. at 193.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 118-22.
184. See id. at 169.
185. See, e.g., Office Operations and Application Processing, 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(e)(1) (2007)
(requiring food stamp eligibility workers to explain claimants' rights and responsibilities during
application interviews).
186. In addition, taxpayers apparently feel more pressure to comply from their friends than
from the IRS's enforcement apparatus. See TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE VOL. I, supra note 178, at
112-13. Also, if friends see the program's human face when they apply, this may increase the
community's collective commitment to program integrity.
187. See JOHNSTON, supra note 171, at 132-38.
188. These rules can be arcane indeed, in some instances applying different definitions of
common terms to the EITC than to other individual filers. See id. at 138.
189. See id. at 137-38.
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have difficulty getting through to the IRS's telephone service for answers to
their tax questions. Some surveys have found that the advice dispensed over the
telephone is incorrect a great deal of the time. 190 But because a claimant
generally does not have any on-going relationship with any particular IRS
representative, she or he has no way of holding that representative accountable
for erroneous advice on which the claimant relied in committing an error.
This history holds important lessons for Medicaid and the Food Stamp
Program. The lack of the kind of on-going contact with claimants that food
stamp eligibility workers currently have has left the IRS with insufficient information about the nature and extent of errors. It also denied the IRS and
Congress adequate warning about the consequences for the EITC's error rate
that new, complex rules to refine the EITC's targeting seeks to address. These
led to additional errors as newly-ineligible claimants misunderstood these new
rules. Although state agencies commonly argue against changes in food stamp
rules that increase complexity and errors,' 91 commercial tax preparation firms
have no incentive to lobby against similar policies in the EITC: they can simply
raise their fees to cover any additional burdens.
More recently, the IRS has responded to error rates by requiring millions
of claimants to be "pre-certified" for the EITC before they may receive a tax
refund. This is essentially an eligibility verification system, abandoning the
self-attestation and audit approach relied upon in the rest of the tax system.
EITC pre-certification, however, is both far more intrusive and far slower than
any other public benefit program's verification system. In many instances,
fully-eligible taxpayers simply will not have any of the specified pieces of
documentation and will be denied the EITC accordingly. Because the IRS lacks
a network of local offices to assist taxpayers or to interview them to resolve
inconsistencies in their circumstances, pre-certification is likely to deny
benefits to many eligible taxpayers and to require others to spend larger
portions of their refunds on services from preparation firms, some of which will
be up to the task and some of which will not be.
If a state turns administration of Medicaid or the Food Stamp Program
over to a private contractor, it will give up much of the information it relies
upon to maintain a balance between access and program integrity. If its error
rate climbs, it may have little reliable information about the cause. Presumably
contractors will be in no hurry to point fingers at themselves. If the error rate
becomes unacceptable, the program's options for responding are likely to be
limited. With the public administrative infrastructure dismantled, the state is
likely to lack the immediate capacity to resume holding face-to-face interviews
190. U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2007 TAX FILING SEASON: INTERIM RESULTS
AND UPDATES OF PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF PAID PREPARERS AND IRS's MODERNIZATION AND
COMPLIANCE RESEARCH EFFORTS 12 (GAO-07-720T 2007).
191.
See, e.g., AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS'N, CROSSROADS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL
POLICY 37-48 (2001); Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 9, at 1303, 1328.
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with claimants. Instead, it may feel obliged to impose draconian verification
measures that bar many eligible households and, because of the state's lack of
experienced staff, are likely to result in long delays and additional errors. The
EITC's place in the tax system may have made any other administrative
approach infeasible. Medicaid and the Food Stamp Program, however, are not
so constrained.
Privatization has compromised the EITC's design in other ways. Several
of the EITC's substantive features that help make private administration
possible also significantly impede its effectiveness in helping low-income
people avoid hardship. Most significantly, the EITC almost always comes in
the form of a single lump sum, rather than on-going payments to meet living
expenses. 192 This gives the EITC by far the largest mismatch of any antipoverty program between the financial difficulties that trigger the benefit and
the arrival of aid to meet those difficulties. 193 Although performance of some
additional administrative steps can result in up to sixty percent of the ultimate
EITC being paid on an on-going basis, less than one percent of claimants do so,
presumably in part because it has not proven profitable for tax preparers to
offer help with these steps. If Medicaid and the Food Stamp Program similarly
discontinue providing application assistance to claimants, those programs'
design will increasingly depend on which services private vendors find
profitable to provide.
B. PrivateAdministration in Competition with Public Administration
Some states have tried to have public agencies compete with private firms
for the opportunity to provide administrative services. For the most part, this
has consisted of government agencies bidding for sole-source administrative
contracts, either alone or in consortia with private firms. 194 This competition
also could take place between public and private providers of administrative
services within the same jurisdiction. In a sense, VITA projects compete with
private tax preparation firms. Legal services offices competed with private
Congress prohibited those
lawyers to assist SSDI claimants until 1995, when
95
offices from taking cases that could generate fees. 1
Superficially, this would seem an appealing solution to the privatization

192. See JOHNSTON, supra note 171, at 138.
193.
See generally Alstott, supra note 19.
194. For example, Wisconsin allows county welfare departments to bid against private nonprofit and for-profit entities for contracts to operate its cash assistance program. In rural areas,
counties have faced few competitors, but private entities won contracts for all six areas of
Milwaukee. See Kaplan, supra note 121, at 106. Before the Clinton Administration rejected
Texas's application for waivers to privatize administration of dozens of public programs, see
Riccucci, supra note 130, at 18-19, two of the three consortia bidding for the contract paired a
state agency (the welfare department or the labor department) with large computer services and
program management companies.
195.
See Prohibition, 45 C.F.R. § 1632.3 (2006).
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debate: allowing the market to determine whether a public or private
organization is most efficient. For several reasons, however, this competition
seems unlikely to be more than an illusion. First, as discussed above, the
question of whether government or beneficiary should be the purchaser poses
vexing questions.' 96 Whichever way these issues are resolved will necessarily
limit the scope of the competition, privileging some objectives for program
operation and undervaluing others.
Second, defining the public entity that will compete entails difficult
problems. In particular, the amount of capital each competitor commits will
have a major impact on what it can offer. The cost of capital committed to
administering a program will significantly affect private competitors'
profitability; a contract will only be profitable if the contractor can obtain an
adequate return on money spent up front to design forms and automated
systems, to buy office space, and complete other set-up procedures. The
government, on the other hand, already has assets well-adapted for running
public benefit programs. If the public agency bidding for the administrative
contract is allowed to use those assets, it will have fewer costs than its private
competitors. Consider, for example, a public agency that owns several local
welfare offices. Allowing it to keep those-while its private competitors must
pay to rent space-would give it a huge advantage. Denying the public agency
those offices would help level the playing field but would also saddle the rest of
the government with real estate for which it may have little use and for which
little market may exist. Perhaps the most sensible approach is to charge the
bidding agency rent for the offices. 197 But with little private market for large
office spaces in depressed communities, setting the amount of this rent will be
essentially arbitrary-and will have a powerful impact on the ultimate outcome
of the competition. An arbitrary decision made within the government, rather
than a truly free-market competition, will determine who wins the contract.
Little evidence suggests that the government is any better at valuing items for
which no private market exists than it is at allocating resources in the current
system of public administration. Moreover, if a private competitor prevails over
the public agency, the government will likely suffer a loss-because its real
estate holdings are now largely useless-that will not show up in a simple
accounting of the program's operational costs. Similar problems will arise in
connection with office equipment, policy manuals, pension obligations, and the
agency's other assets and obligations.
Finally, and most importantly, proposals for public-private competition
tend to overlook conflicting interests, and resulting agency problems within the
government. Public choice theory typically treats bureaucracies as "black
196. See supra Part IIl.A.2.b.
197. The private bidders also may want to rent some of these offices. If so, setting their
rents-particularly if they want only part of the space-will introduce another element of
arbitrariness.
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boxes" whose primary goal is to maximize their own budgets.' Whatever the
validity of this crude aggregation under other circumstances,199 it badly
obscures divergent motives that are likely to hobble public agencies in this
competition.
For example, a bureaucracy's political leaders may be chosen for their
ideological commitment to privatization. 200 This may trump any empirebuilding temptations. Alternatively, they may feel that their political
advancement to the next, more appealing post (or their obtaining work with a
contractor) depends on their successful privatization of their current
bureaucracy's work. More broadly, if they are convinced that the proper
outcome of any competition is that the private contractors prevail, they may
feel that any investments in the bureaucracy's competitiveness are futile.
Career managers might prefer higher budgets, but first and foremost they
will seek to retain employment. 20 1 Thus, if reducing the budget is crucial to
avoiding the dissolution of the agency in favor of a private contractor, they may
do so in ways that have an adverse impact on performance. Their expertise, and
often their knowledge of the people judging the bids, may allow them to design
cuts whose adverse consequences are difficult to measure. Alternatively, if their
political masters clearly favor privatization, they may see that outcome as
inevitable and their zealous pursuit of it crucial to retaining employment in the
rump of an agency that remains to administer the contract-or crucial to gain
employment with the winning bidder. 202
Some of a public agency's front-line employees also may not see the
agency's success as being in their interests. Apart from whatever altruistic
concerns may have driven them into human services work in the first place,
employees' selfish motivation is to maximize their earnings. For many, that
will mean continuing to work for the government, giving them an incentive to
improve its performance. For some of the most talented, however, a private
contractor might pay better and offer greater opportunities for advancement.
Thus, they may not rally to help the agency win the competition.
As a result, private contractors will compete aggressively, while the public
agency is likely to face severe constraints. Most competitions of this kind are
established by policymakers who are ideologically committed to privatization.
As such, policymakers are unlikely to give public agencies the flexibility and
203
They also may be
the access to capital required to compete effectively.
198.

See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 362-63 (2003).

199.

See STREET ET AL., supra note 177, at 48-63.

200. See Breaux et al., supra note 110, at 46.
201.
Public choice theory addresses the usual situation in which bureaucrats' jobs are
secure or, at least, their tenure security has no inverse relationship to the bureaucracy's budget.
202. Some also may feel they would enjoy a better quality of life working for a smaller
entity, either public or private. See COASE, supra note 70, at 42.
203. To much the same effect, the agency may be saddled with pension and other costs that
the government must bear no matter who wins the competition. Also, some of the agency's best
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tempted to skew the competition overtly, requiring public contestants to meet
20 4
higher standards than those applied to private bidders.
The competition is unlikely to be any better if services are purchased on
an as-needed basis. Finding ways to motivate the public agency to compete will
be difficult. Thus, although both public and private administrative help are
available in SSA's disability determination process, no true public-private competition exists: when a claimant chooses to rely solely upon its assistance, the
SSA incurs marginal costs but few if any marginal benefits.20 5 This is because
agencies' administrative budgets do not reliably expand in response to
06
increased workloads. 2
C. Lessonsfrom Antitrust Theory for the PrivatizationDebate
It is no small irony that demands for the privatization of government
functions-in essence, demands for divestures by the governmental
conglomerate-come in an era of aggressive mergers and acquisitions in the
private sector. Some of the same groups that urge the government to accept the
concentration of functions within single large, vertically-integrated private
corporations criticize the government's vertical integration in the operation of
public benefit programs. 207 Government administration of public benefit
programs has characteristics of both horizontal and vertical combinations
within an industry, as well as conglomerates across industry lines. Privatization
can be seen as an attempt to disintegrate programs' operations in each of these
dimensions. Moreover, both public and private administration will affect other
markets and, hence, implicate some of the concerns present in antitrust analyses
of tying arrangements.
Scholars have warned that antitrust principles cannot usefully be applied
to make government functions more competitive, 2 0 and the Court has
agreed. 2 0 9 Thus, even if the government's administration of public benefit
programs violated antitrust principles, that would not, by itself, be grounds for
and most financially savvy staff may be removed to help write the specifications and process the

bids.
204. For example, Wisconsin required county welfare departments to demonstrate
substantial savings in order to get and keep contracts to administer its cash assistance programs;
private entrants need only to submit the lowest bid.
205. SSA may benefit from winning the "competition" with a private representative only if
that representative would complicate the process enough that SSA must expend more
administrative resources than it would have providing all necessary assistance itself.
206. The Reagan Administration cut one-third of SSA's front-line staff during the early
1980s, even as the quantity and rigor of its disability adjudications were rising dramatically.
207. Compare Adrian T. Moore, Privatization on a Roll, AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 68, with Robert Bork, This Antitrust Theory Won't Fly, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1999 (AEI
scholar criticizing antitrust enforcement against airline).
208. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, 100c.
209. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. 736 (2004) (finding no antitrust
liability against federal government or its instrumentalities); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943) (same for states).
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change. In fact, however, the lack of competition in public benefit programs
springs not from anti-competitive actions of the government but rather from
efficiencies achieved through the current method of operation. At the behest of
conservative law and economics scholars, antitrust law no longer criticizes
market dominance resulting from superior efficiencies.
This Section applies that precept to program administration, arguing that
more efficient public administration should not be punished. Subsection 1 tests
the current mode of administration against antitrust principles criticizing
horizontal combinations. This Subsection also considers the possibility that privatization of public benefit programs' administrations may divert productive
resources from activities that would otherwise compete with those programs.
Subsection 2 notes that the same factors identified above that guide the
government's "make-or-buy" decision with regard to public benefit program
administrative services are accepted in antitrust law as justifications for vertical
integration. Subsection 3 considers whether any antitrust concerns that still
apply to conglomerates have any application to the privatization debate.
Finally, Subsection 4 compares the tying likely to occur with public
administration of benefit programs with that possible under private
administration.
1. Horizontal Combinations

Like a horizontally-integrated company, the government has a nearmonopoly on the provision of subsistence benefits to low-income people within
its jurisdiction. 210 If one defines the market for aid nationally, one can find
some interstate competition as states offer parallel versions of federally-funded
programs. State programs diverge from one another only modestly with respect
to food stamps, but can have dramatic variances in Medicaid, SCHIP, and
particularly cash assistance. Otherwise, private charities offer some aid, but the
amount pales compared to that provided through public benefit programs.
Antitrust law has largely abandoned the approach of breaking up large
firms merely because they are large. 2 11 Those horizontal combinations that
seek to improve efficiency, rather than market dominance, enhance consumer
welfare.2 12 Moreover, the government's behavior could hardly depart more
dramatically from that of the jealous near-monopolist. 213 Far from trying to
210.

In a more generous social welfare system, one might imagine programs operated by

various levels of government offering alternative means of avoiding destitution. In practice, this

approach is rare within this country. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(b) (2000) (offering certain Native
Americans the choice of food stamps or government commodities). Our major programs' benefits
are so modest that low-income people typically need to combine whatever they can to achieve

basic subsistence.
211.

See POSNER, ANTITRUST 2d ed., supra note 38, at 101-17; BORK, supra note 32, at

212.

See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 230 (1985).

213.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 10.8, at 308-14 (6th ed.

221.
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exclude potential competitors, the government makes open-ended offers to
subsidize them through tax deductions for charitable contributions. Recent
devolutionary changes in all major public benefit programs have also expanded
states' ability to compete meaningfully with one another. 21 4 The government's

near-monopoly in providing public benefits springs largely from its natural
monopoly in operating the tax system and secondarily from the natural
monopoly in administering these programs. 215 Contemporary antitrust policy
recognizes that some horizontal combinations, 2even
those formed by mergers,
16
can benefit consumers by improving efficiency.
The extent and value of competition among providers of subsistence

benefits is contested. Somewhat ironically, conservatives, who advocate
breaking up the government's role in program administration through
privatization and reliance on private charity, view the current system as more
competitive than many liberals do. Conservatives contend that states with more
generous programs will function as "welfare magnets," drawing low-income
people from less generous states. 217 Many liberals ridicule the notion that

people will leave their social support systems for a few extra dollars, although
some contend that the fear of being a welfare magnet has contributed to a "race
to the bottom" in which states compete to adopt ever-more draconian policies.
On the other218hand, liberals have been enthusiastic about competition cast as
"pluralism."

If one defines the relevant market for subsistence benefits as a state, or a
part of a state, private charities and some local governments provide the only
organized competition to federal and state public benefit programs. 219 Although
their scope pales in comparison, they have some limited capacity to assist
2003) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].

214. For a critical account of how the procedural themes of devolution and privatization
together have undermined substantive policy goals, see Michaels, supra note 20.
215.
To be sure, states operate tax systems parallel to the federal one. These are motivated
by sovereignty, not efficiency, concerns. States seek to reduce the inefficiency of their systems by
relying as much as possible on federal policies and determinations. See David A. Super,
Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2602-04 (2005) [hereinafter Super,
Fiscal Federalism]. State tax systems are particularly ill suited to supporting means-tested
benefits. Id. at 2568-80.
216. See Hughes et al., supra note 95, at 43-44; BORK, supra note 32, at 222.
217. See PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. RoM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A
NATIONAL STANDARD 24-38 (1990); but cf, POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 213, §
10.6, at 304-05 (noting that high transportation costs can segment a market).
218.
MARTIN, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 137 at 233-34.
219. Some conservative critics of federal and state public benefit programs build their
arguments around the assumed availability of these alternative sources of aid for the needy. See,
e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY

1950-1980, at 226-32

(1984); Robert L. Woodson, Sr., Welfare Reform: A Message from the "Receiving End,"
NATIONAL FORUM: THE PHI KAPPA PHI JOURNAL, Summer 1996, at 15. Sustaining these
programs, as tenuous as they often are, is therefore critical to the substantive conservative agenda.
It also is a source of hope to liberals. See generally Frank Munger, Beyond Welfare Reform: Can
We Build a Local Welfare State?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999 (2004).
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people that fall through the cracks of the larger programs. This is an important
function, both for the low-income individuals involved and as a means of
identifying systematic defects in federal and state programs. For example, state
and local governments' advocacy, seeking to relieve demands on programs
they operate without federal support, played a crucial part in persuading
welfare law's rules disqualifying legal
Congress to moderate the 1996
220
immigrants from public benefits.
These charities and local governments can plausibly decide that they can
obtain the greatest return for their limited resources by helping claimants apply
for benefits that federal and state governments fund, rather than by
administering and funding their own programs. This will be particularly true
where they perceive a large number of people substantively eligible for federal
or state benefits that are failing to qualify because of administrative problems.
Any change in federal or state programs that increases the procedural demands
on claimants or reduces the administrative resources available to help them
meet those demands, therefore, 22is1 likely to reduce competition from private
charities and local governments.
Diminution in administrative assistance to claimants is not at all inevitable
in privatization, but some current proposals clearly make less assistance
available. In particular, Texas, Indiana, and other states' privatization plans
involve closing many or most local assistance offices, turning their
222
This would
responsibilities over to "call centers" operated by contractors.
largely eliminate assistance to claimants that are unable to access call centers
due to disability, illiteracy, or other impediments. 223 Texas acknowledged this
deficit resulting from lay-offs of over four thousand state employees. Texas
assumed the shortfall in assistance would be made up by one million hours per
year of uncompensated labor from non-profit organizations. This brought
protests from non-profit groups that the assumed labor is unlikely to be

220. Sheri Steisel, Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, States May Bear the Costs of Helping
Immigrants, STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 1997), available at http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/
WELFARE/HELPIMM.HTM; Robert Greene, County Officials Say They Have Made Headway in
Effort to Obtain FederalFunds, METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE, May 8, 1998, at 11.
221.
This bears some resemblance to the practice of denying competitors access to
inexpensive raw materials. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: RaisingRivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 232-34 (1986)
(finding this practice deserving antitrust criticism under some circumstances). Although
volunteers' time and donors' money are nominally free to a non-profit, in fact the group's
leadership must expend resources recruiting and tending to supporters. The marginal cost of
additional volunteers and donors is likely to increase. A non-profit that has devoted its existing,
relatively inexpensive, volunteers to helping low-income people qualify for federal and state
benefits may be unable to find enough additional sustainable resources to mount a competing
program of its own.
222. See Letter from William Ludwig, Regional Administrator, U.S. Dep't of Agric., to
William Hawkins, Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm'n (Sept. 26, 2005).
223. See Letter from Tom Harkin, Senator, to Mike Johanns, Sec'y of Agric. (Aug. 23,
2005).
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available and that whatever resources they do provide will detract from their
core missions. 224 Thus, far from enhancing the role of private charities and
local governments as competitors to large public programs, these plans actually
225
deplete their capacity to play that role.
Vertical Combinations

2.

First and foremost, privatization is a challenge to the vertical integration
of program operation: an attempt to separate financial support and whatever
other functions the government retains from those proposed to be shifted to
private concerns. Like a vertically-integrated company, the government takes
226
responsibility for several stages of production of means-tested benefits.
Although horizontal combinations typically result from desires either to wield
monopoly power or to enjoy economies of scale, vertical combinations
traditionally have been seen as efforts to reduce transaction costs. 2 27 Having
sequential steps in production take place within a single organization avoids the
"transactional haggling, opportunism, and uncertainty that contaminates buyerseller relationships., 228 Economists also have seen vertical combinations as
efforts to reduce uncertainty and vulnerability to exercises of market power by
those at other levels of the production process. 229 Organizational theorists
similarly see vertical integration as a means for an entity to manage uncertainty
and risk.230
Antitrust law rejects the view that an entity choosing to handle a step in
the production process internally "is guilty of monopolizing because [it] is
unnecessarily restricting competition" that would have occurred if bids had
been taken. 231 Accordingly, vertical combinations do not necessarily reduce
competition, although they are more common where relatively little
224.

See, e.g., Ferrell Foster, Agency Relies on Churches to Connect Poor to State Aid

Programs THE BAPTIST STANDARD, Sept. 3, 2004, available at http://www.baptiststandard.com/

postnuke/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=2244.
225.
See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP:
WELFARE STATE 163-65 (2001) [hereinafter KATZ, CITIZENSHIP].
226. See supra Part II.
227.

REDEFINING THE AMERICAN

See WALTER H. GOLDBERG, MERGERS: MOTIVES, MODES, METHODS 52 (1983).

Conglomerates traditionally were said to seek to diversify their businesses and hence reduce risk.
Id. This rationale seems to fit governments well since different services will appeal to different
segments of the electorate. A proposal that government discontinue a particular service effectively
increases the government's dependency on the constituencies for its remaining services and its
risk of losing power should some of those groups become disgruntled.
228. Id. at 110.
229. See id. at 53; see generally F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS
BEHAVIOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION FORM ON ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR

(1970).
230.

See generally

BASES

ADMINISTRATIVE

OF

JAMES D. THOMPSON,

THEORY

(1967);

ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE

Jeffrey Pfeffer,

Merger as a

Response to

OrganizationalInterdependence, 17 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 382 (1972).
231. POSNER, ANTITRUST 2d ed., supra note 38, at 201-02; BORK, supra note 32, at 226-45.
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competition exists at the stages of production before or after that in which a
given entity is engaged.232 Thus, a manufacturer that depends on obtaining
critical parts from a relatively uncompetitive market is more likely to seek to
produce its own parts to avoid the risks of sudden run-ups in prices. 233 More
broadly, the efficiency of vertical integration 234
depends on the factors identified
above as shaping the "make-or-buy" decision.
Applying this principle to public benefit programs, then, rational
managers might be expected to want to concentrate the activities required to
operate a program in the government's hands, unless those activities can be
turned over to a relatively competitive private market. Experience to date seems
to bear out this hypothesis. The major programs that have privatized application
preparation, EITC, SSDI, SSI, and GSL, rely on competitive markets in tax
preparation, legal services, and loans. No comparable market is available for
assistance in applying for food stamps, Medicaid, and other benefits, 235 making
continued vertical integration logical. By contrast, those functions that have
been most privatized, such as the issuance and transaction of benefits, also
parallel activities in the private market that have spawned substantial competition. Issuing EBT and Medicaid cards is not very different from issuing credit
and debit cards, an activity several companies perform. Converting food stamps
into food, vouchers into housing, or Medicaid coverage into health care is what
supermarkets, landlords, and physicians do every day in cash transactions.
3.

Government as a Conglomerate

Little imagination is required to see the government as a conglomerate,
operating a host of relatively unrelated activities. To the extent that antitrust
traditionally has been concerned with conglomerates or conglomerate mergers,
those concerns have reflected fears that the conglomerate could mobilize
resources from its other, unrelated, lines of business for a short-term effort to
crush competition in a particular market. 236 In effect, the argument is that
enterprises within the conglomerate have access to short-term capital at belowmarket costs and thus can sustain losses while selling at prices other firms
cannot afford to match. Conservative law and economics scholars have argued

232. See GOLDBERG, supra note 227, at 110-11.
233. For example, an automobile manufacturer may feel the need to make many of its own
model-specific parts because it could not continue to make cars without them, and it would take
some time for another firm to begin making those parts if the company's regular supplier were to
fail. By contrast, a coffee shop is less likely to enter the donut-making business since the latter is
likely to be competitive already and, if the coffee shop's supply of donuts ever were threatened, it
could switch to pastries or muffins.
234. See supra Part III.A. 1.
235. See supra Part III.A.2.c.
236. See Alan Hughes & Ajit Singh, Mergers, Concentration, and Competition in
Advanced Capitalist Economies: An International Perspective, in THE DETERMINANTS AND
EFFECTS OF MERGERS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 1, 13-14 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1980).
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that the proper focus is not size, but actual anti-competitive behavior. 237 They
have largely prevailed in that argument.
This suggests that antitrust doctrine and prevailing economic theory offer
scant support for privatization of public benefit programs merely to reduce the
size of the government. 238 Even a more populist antitrust policy lends little
support to privatization as an anti-conglomerate measure. To be sure, public
benefit programs are expensive undertakings that could benefit from greater
access to funds. That need for funds, however, is chronic and is not related to
any anti-competitive efforts. More importantly, the need for those resources is
in program financing, an aspect of the program that privatizers would leave in
government hands.
4.

Tying Public Benefits Administration with Other Services

Another antitrust concern, which can arise in connection with vertical
integration or conglomerates, is the relationship between markets for distinct
products. Even if a firm is prevailing in one market legitimately due to superior
product design, it may still be guilty of anti-competitive behavior if it leverages
that advantage to enhance the market for one of its other products. For
example, the Justice Department accused Microsoft of selling its Windows
operating system, which had won market dominance, as a package with other
products that would not have done as well had they competed on their
individual merits. Tying applies monopoly power held in one market to
239
improve a seller's position in another.
Under either public administration or sole-source contracting, one entity
will have a clear monopoly on access to the public benefit in question. Even
where application assistance is purchased on an as-needed basis from a number
of vendors, those vendors are likely to develop a trust relationship with
claimants, giving them the opportunity to sell an additional, unrelated service
as a credence good. Accordingly, assessing the respective competitive
consequences of public and private entities' administration of public benefit
programs requires examining the impact on the markets for other services that
each of them provides. Subsection a examines the likely increase in
consumption of other public benefits when a public agency administers a given
program. Subsection b then identifies some services that private firms may be
able to sell to claimants if they administer public benefit programs.

237.

See generally POSNER, ANTITRUST 2d ed., supra note 38, at 51-100.

238. These arguments also suffer from ambiguity as to what the "size of government"
means. Exponents of this view commonly cite tax burdens as a reason for wanting to shrink
government, see supra notes 41-42, yet only the elimination of government functions, not their
assignment to private contractors, reduces the government's need for revenues.
239. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19, 23 (1957).
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a.

The Advantages of Tying with Other Public Functions

Many of the steps required to obtain one public benefit closely parallel
those required to obtain another. The claimant must learn of the program, learn
of the entity administering the program, and contact that entity. The claimant
must provide and verify her or his identity, residence, family composition,
income, and other personal circumstances. An interview is commonly required.
To reduce burdens on both claimants and the government, programs
increasingly provide for "one-stop shopping" or "no wrong door" policies
allowing claimants to apply for multiple programs at a single location."' Some
programs also confer adjunctive eligibility, deferring to determinations made
by other programs. 241
Antitrust policy would not criticize the relationship among publicly
administered programs, although they could technically be termed tie-ins,
because the relationships are the product of economies of joint production and
sale. Efficiency, rather than efforts to marginalize competing providers, drives
the relationships. 242 For similar reasons, consumers typically buy tires with
their cars even though it would technically be possible to buy a tireless car and
separately purchase tires and fit them to the car.
The loss of tying among public benefit programs would increase the
government's cost of administration and reduce the net value of the benefits to
claimants. 243 In theory, privatization need not disrupt common application
arrangements if all programs involved employ the same contractor at the same
time. In practice, however, states that have privatized application processing in
SCHIP have been effectively unable to comply with the statutory requirement
that they "screen and enroll" in Medicaid any SCHIP applicants meeting
244
Medicaid's eligibility requirements.
b.

The Problems with Tying with Other PrivateFunctions

Privatization of the administration of public benefit programs presents an
opportunity for contractors to tie the programs' operations to other private
activities. In fact, this has been a major motivation for ideological advocates of
privatization: tying the receipt of public benefits to the provision of particular
moral messages. Commercial tying presents the greatest risk to vulnerable

240. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2020(i) (2000) (food stamps, cash assistance, and SSI); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(54) (2000) (Medicaid and WIC); id. § 1397ee(a)(4) (Medicaid and SCHIP).
241. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (2000) (deeming most households in which all members
receive TANF benefits, SSI, or certain general assistance benefits "categorically eligible" for food
stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(E) (2000) (deeming most SSI recipients eligible for Medicaid);
id. § 1786(e)(2) (deeming TANF and food stamp recipients financially eligible for WIC).
242. Bowman, supra note 239, at 29.
243. Although some conservatives applaud these barriers as laudable incentives, they are in
fact highly inefficient. See Super, Invisible Hand,supra note 28, at 825-30.
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4) (2000).
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245

populations served by social welfare programs.
Examples of tying the
privatized administration of public benefits programs to particular moral
messages and commercial services are discussed below.
Efforts to engage religious organizations in the administration of these
programs have sought to tie the distribution of aid to those groups' moral messages. 246 A much-debated feature of the 1996 welfare law sought to facilitate
this contracting as "charitable choice."2 47 Both political and constitutional
concerns have encouraged proponents of "charitable choice" to remain coy
about the extent of tying they envision. In practice, the legislation appears to
have done little: most religious organizations reported little difficulty in
competing with secular groups for available contracts before PRWORA. 248 On
the other hand, the law's limits on tying also seem to have proven ineffectual,
with some religious contractors imposing requirements, such as attendance at
worship services, that PRWORA did not authorize. 249 This tying may become
an even more serious issue if charities are tasked to distribute more valuable
benefits, such as Medicaid and food stamps.
Tying in the commercial context is even more worrisome. Privatized
administration of EITC has allowed tax preparation firms to tie it to their other
services. Most obviously, someone using a tax preparation firm to claim the
federal EITC may pay more to have her state income tax prepared as well, even
if she is under the threshold at which such returns must be filed. Much more
troublingly, tax preparers have aggressively promoted "refund anticipation
loans" (RALs). Although many taxpayers appear to believe that a RAL is an
expedited refund from the IRS, in fact it is a loan for which an anticipated
refund is collateral. Financially unsophisticated EITC claimants overestimate
the likely delay in receiving refunds and underestimate the effective interest
rates represented by RAL fees-from an annual rate of 97% in low cases to
222% in typical cases to more than 2000% in high cases. 250 Because the IRS
provides markers to preparation firms indicating when a taxpayer's refund is
due to be intercepted, these loans entail extraordinarily low risk to the lenders.
The conjunction of private EITC administration and RAL marketing apparently
has gutted competition in loan rates: a study found those rates higher in areas
with large numbers of tax preparers and loan offices. Nonetheless, in some
areas two-thirds of EITC claimants take out RALs.

245.
It is no answer to say that the additional services are given rather than sold to lowincome people seeking public benefits through non-profit providers. Bundling and tying are
functionally equivalent. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 213, § 10.10, at 321-22.
246. See Mark Chaves, Religious Congregations and Welfare Reform: Assessing the
Potential, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE WORK? COVERING RELIGION'S IMPACT ON URBAN
AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 121, 123-26, 132-33 (Andrew Walsh ed., 2001).

247.
248.
249.
250.

See PRWORA, supra note 8, § 104.
See Chaves, supra note 246, at 121-22.
See id.
Id. at 142.
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Adding insult to injury, some tax preparation firms installed checkcashing machines in their offices charging an average of 2.2% of the amount of
the RAL check.251 Here again, the transaction has a spectacularly low risk, with
checks all coming from tax preparation firms the check-cashing company
considered solvent enough to merit placing its machine in their offices. The net
effect of these fees is that recipients of typical EITCs can pay 11 percent of
their benefits for administration and delivery costs. This is, of course, in
addition to the amounts the IRS pays for information, processing, audit and
enforcement functions that it retains as well as the time claimants must spend
compiling records and working with the preparation firm.
None of this likely rises to the level of tying that antitrust law forbids: a
self-confident, assertive, well-informed consumer could easily select the
services she or he wants to purchase and reject the rest. These practices are
nonetheless troubling because they target a population that disproportionately
includes people with little self-confidence or assertiveness in commercial
matters and with limited information about programs' administration and the
value of related services.
Similar commercial tying would be possible if administration of Medicaid
and food stamps were privatized. H&R Block, a large commercial tax
preparation firm, is preparing to offer food stamp eligibility determinations as
part of its services. The value of these determinations is questionable because
tax returns report annual information from a prior period while food stamp
eligibility depends on monthly information from the current period; and, of
course, Block's conclusions will carry no weight with the food stamp office. 252
Nonetheless, Block appears to have determined that offering this service will
attract additional customers. Privatization that replaces local food stamp offices
with distant call centers is likely to increase demand for advisory opinions and
help completing applications among claimants with limited telephone access
and those uncomfortable with or unable to use technology. Block would then
be well-positioned to sell food stamp claimants its tax preparation services.
Should Block obtain an official role in food stamp administration, these
opportunities would multiply.
The same analysis applies to commercial tying with Medicaid. Indeed, as
a more valuable benefit, Medicaid has greater susceptibility to tying with other
products. Most obviously, managed care companies will be well-positioned to
enroll any beneficiaries they help to apply for Medicaid; even under the current
system, managed care companies conduct Medicaid and SCHIP outreach for
this purpose. Reductions in government-funded application assistance would
offer these companies even greater opportunities to guide new beneficiaries to
select them. The focus of competition among managed care companies thus
251.
252.
(2007).

Id.
See Determining Household Eligibility and Benefit Levels, 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(c)
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would shift from quality and accessibility of care to the aggressiveness of
application assistance; this distortion presumably would be have a deleterious
effect on the value, though not the cost, of Medicaid benefits. A more in-depth
interaction with prospective beneficiaries also might yield information to
facilitate adverse selection, helping companies avoid enrolling persons likely to
have costly medical needs.
Companies offering supplemental insurance policies of dubious value,
nursing homes, firms seeking volunteers for medical testing, home health
services, and even funeral homes might find it advantageous to help claimants
apply for Medicaid and steer successful ones toward their services. To be sure,
these incentives already exist, and some service providers already provide
application assistance. Reductions in the availability of public application
assistance, however, could vastly expand the pool of claimants seeking
application assistance and hence the return to resources invested in building the
capacity to provide it. Tying the markets for administrative services and health
care services likely would result in reduced quality in each. In some instances,
it also could result in increased consumption of health care services, imposing
additional hidden burdens on the public fisc.
IV
PRIVATIZATION'S IMPACT ON PUBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS' EFFICIENCY IN
PROVIDING VALUE TO THE ELECTORATE

Although public benefit programs provide direct material aid to their
recipients, they owe their existence to the support of the electorate. 253 If these
programs did not convey to the electorate utility that exceeds their cost, they
would cease to exist absent some failure of the political process. 254 This value
could come in a wide range of forms. Some voters may feel satisfaction for
helping those in need, others may find a more egalitarian income distribution
appealing, still others may have instrumental motives, perhaps anticipating
expanded markets for particular goods or services, a more productive future
workforce, reduced risk of social disturbances, or a better image for this
253. Politicians commonly discuss this problem in terms of taxpayers, rather than the
electorate. This seems erroneous and likely to produce inaccurate utility calculations. Taxpayers
may provide the funding for government, which in turn provides the funding for public programs,
but the programs' existence depends on the support of the electorate. Although the two groups
overlap substantially, voters, not taxpayers, make voluntary decisions that make programs
possible.
254. Political failures of this kind, through which elected officials or their appointees create
or continue a program lacking significant popular support, are considered below.
It should be noted, however, that support need not extend to a majority of the electorate in
order to sustain a program. A minority that feels strongly enough about a particular program can
trade its backing for other groups' priorities for their support for the program in question. In these
cases, the program may be directly increasing the utility only of its core supporters; to be
politically sustainable, the program must provide them enough utility to win not only their support
but their willingness to make side deals to cobble together a majority for the program.
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country abroad.
Whatever individual voters' preferences, the electorate is the "owner" of
the "firms" that are public benefit programs. And just as the efficiency of firms
in the private sector can be measured by the returns they produce on their
owners' capital, the efficiency of a public benefit program can be measured by
how much utility it produces for the electorate relative to the tax dollars
expended and the public capital used to carry it out.
Over time, the eiectorate's expectations for program function and design
change. For example, as concerns about inefficient cost-shifting in the health
care system increase, spending to reduce the ranks of the uninsured may
produce more utility than a comparable amount of money spent on another
social welfare program. At the same time, the relative costs of various possible
programs changes over time: for example, health care inflation has made
Medicaid more and more expensive every year relative to the Food Stamp
Program. Thus, to provide maximum value to the electorate, a program must
respond both to variations in the costs of producing this or that benefit and to
variations in which benefits the electorate values having produced.
This Part considers the ways in which transferring additional aspects of
program operations to private entities could reduce the electorate's ability to
obtain maximum satisfaction from the programs it authorizes. Section A
examines the reduction in flexibility policymakers have to respond to changing
public preferences when important aspects of program administration are
locked into long-term contracts with private vendors. In effect, a long-term
contract raises the transaction costs of implementing policy changes. Section B
explores the increase in information costs that policymakers and the electorate
are likely to suffer as a result of privatization. Finally, section C considers the
ways in which the electorate may experience reduced agency as a result of
privatization. The cumulative effect of these distortions is likely to be a serious
divergence between the actual architecture of public benefit programs and the
one that would produce the greatest utility for the electorate.
A.

Loss of PolicymakingFlexibility

Quite apart from the shortages of information about the program's
operation discussed below, contracting out administration is likely to result in
some significant policy paralysis. Many important policies will be set by way
of the contract between the vendor and the government. Defining quality in
terms concrete enough to be included in a contract is exceedingly difficult. 255 It
is a concept that is inherently political; 256 thus, by signing a long-term contract

255. See Arthur J. Katz, Quality of Service, Professionalism,and the Purchase of Service
Factor, in SOCIAL SERVICES BY GOVERNMENT CONTRACT: A POLICY ANALYSIS 92, 93 (Kenneth
R. Wedel et al. eds., 1979).
256. Id. at 93-96.
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with a particular definition of quality, a political administration can extend its
reach far beyond the term for which it was elected. During the life of those
contracts, changes in policy may be difficult or impossible. Contractors can
demand a huge premium to change requirements during the term of the
contract. Flaws in the program thus will be allowed to persist months or years
after they are recognized, impairing its effectiveness and bringing public
criticism.
For example, after the Food Stamp Program converted to electronic
benefit delivery, contractors imposed heavy charges for changes made during
the term of their contracts. This had many ramifications, one of which was to
delay the implementation of interoperability, which allows claimants with cards
from one state to buy groceries in another. Similarly, some states postponed
their adoption of transitional food stamps and other options under the 2002
Farm Bill to help low-income working families because they could not afford
to pay automation contractors to make the required changes to their systems.
Policymakers may lose further flexibility as private contractors become
active lobbyists on public benefit policy. Service providers and vendors in
Medicaid, WIC, and other programs have already done so. These providers and
vendors naturally pursue the interests of their shareholders. Adopting policies
that improve a program's effectiveness or integrity therefore may become difficult politically if those policies might undermine contractors' profitability.
Winning approval of such policies may require that the contractors be "bought
off," diverting funds that could otherwise expand benefits. Some states have
had to reduce Medicaid coverage for families with children severely in part
because of the hospital, nursing home, and managed care industries' ability to
resist proposals to share the pain of budget shortfalls more broadly.
B. Information Problems:Reduced Access to ProgramData
The electorate requires reliable information about the operation of public
benefit programs so that it can both take pleasure in those programs' past
work-the direct benefit it receives from its investment-and decide how much
of those programs it wants to "buy" in the future. Public officials, in turn,
require fairly detailed information about programs' operations to make the
ongoing adjustments required to make those programs deliver the most utility
for their master, the electorate. Making sound policy in public benefit programs
depends on having adequate information.
For several reasons, the quality of program data is likely to decline if
administration is turned over to a private contractor. As Subsection 1 discusses,
contractors may seek to withhold much of this information as proprietary.
Subsection 2 explains that contracting also is likely to reduce both the quantity
and the value of data collected on programs' operations, data that is vital to
making appropriate policy changes. Subsection 3 describes how the separation
of policymaking from operations is likely to further constrict the flow of vital
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information despite the best intentions of all concerned. Finally, and perhaps
most seriously, Subsection 4 demonstrates that privatization is likely to mislead
the electorate about both programs' costs and their benefits.
l. ProprietaryInformation and Government Openness
Public benefit programs represent important moral decisions by society to
expend resources to aid low-income people. With taxpayers' dollars funding
such programs, the public has an obvious need and right to know how those
dollars are being distributed. With these needs in mind, federal regulations
contain numerous provisions allowing both claimants and members of the
general public access to information about public benefit program operations.
The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 257 and similar state laws
provide further access to program information. Both federal and state
administrative agencies supplement this supply of information through websites
and other means.
Turning over crucial components of a public benefit program's operations
to a private contractor would significantly reduce the availability of information
for several reasons. First, since the contractor's obligation to its stockholders is
to maximize its profitability, it will be unlikely to devote resources to providing
public information that is not specifically required by its contract. 258 Second,
many of the laws and rules that currently require program information to be
made public will not apply to contractors. FOIA and similar state laws apply
only to the government, not its contractors. Some federal rules requiring
information to be made available to the public describe specific documents that
259
state agencies prepare but that contractors might not.
Third, and most important, contractors are likely to regard much of the
most important information about their policies and operations as proprietary.
The Coca-Cola Company works diligently to protect information about how it
manufactures soft drinks. Pharmaceutical companies fight mightily to keep
confidential its processes for formulating drugs. Microsoft is highly protective
of the source code for its programs. In the public benefits context, a
contractor's "product" will be the administration of the program. It creates that
"product" with its policies and procedures. Having access to those policies and
procedures presumably would give other prospective bidders a distinct
257. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
258. See DEMSETZ, supra note 76, at 43-44 (noting that retaining secrets is essential to
businesses' ability to compete).
259. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R, §§ 271.3, 271.4, 272.4(c), 273.15(p) (2007) (requiring state food
stamp agencies to make various kinds of information public). Florida's privatization proposal
declined to specify which current requirements it seeks to waive; Texas did not release the details
of the bid that it accepted from Accenture. Thus, in neither case is it clear how many of the
documents USDA's regulations require to be made public would continue to be prepared and
released by the state agency, how many would be prepared and held confidential by the contractor,
and how many would cease to exist altogether.
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competitive advantage: they will not have to expend the resources to design
these procedures from scratch and can concentrate on finding ways to improve
on the first contractor's approach. Contractors therefore are likely to refuse to
release many of the kinds of information that state agencies routinely make
available to the public. Although the state can try to negotiate a contract that
requires release of some of this information, the contractor can be expected to
resist vigorously and to insist on a premium price for exposing itself to this
very real competitive disadvantage. At best, any likely compromise will leave
low-income households and the public at large with far less access to information about program operations than they have today.
The potential consequences of this loss of access to program information
are troubling. If program participation begins to drop sharply at a time of rising
poverty, it may be difficult or impossible to determine the cause. Determining
whether corrective action is needed, much less what kind, will be exceedingly
difficult.
Applicants and recipients, in turn, may have no way to determine why an
eligibility worker is imposing onerous verification requirements. Is that the
contractor's policy for all applicants? Is it the policy for all applicants of a
particular category into which the eligibility worker believes, perhaps
erroneously, that the applicant falls? Does it mean that the eligibility worker
distrusts this particular applicant, perhaps for reasons that the applicant could
readily clear up? Or do the requirements reflect personal hostility, or even
racism? Each of these possibilities may call for a different course of action. Yet
the applicant may be left with nothing more than speculation if the contractor
keeps its policies secret. Having these kinds of doubts linger is unhealthy for
the program in particular and society in general. The experiences of applicants
like this may persuade other eligible people, incorrectly, that it would be futile
for them to apply.
2. Reduced and Misdirected Data Collection Activities
Even if contractors do not actively withhold data, they may nonetheless
choose not to collect the amount and type of information required to adjust
programs' operations to maximize desired outcomes. Contractors can be expected to undertake only those data collection activities that their contracts
specifically require. Contracts require contractors to produce some specific
types of data about the program's operation. After the contract is signed, the
government can offer to pay its contractor to collect additional data that had not
initially seemed important, but the contractor's monopoly position is likely to
result in a very high price.
Policymaking in public benefit programs depends heavily on data produced by the research staffs of administering agencies. Time and again, important questions about program policy have been decided on the basis of an obscure table or chart providing valuable insights into how the program was
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operating. Had a state entered into a long-term contract to operate its Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program prior to the Family
Support Act of 1988,260 it might not have thought to require collection of
detailed information about recipients' efforts to secure employment. Such a
state would have been ill-equipped to plan a major welfare-to-work program or
to monitor the effectiveness of any program it did launch without paying a
premium for new data collection or waiting for the expiration of its contract.
Similarly, had the Food Stamp Program's operation been contracted out
prior to the mid-I 990s, it seems unlikely anyone would have thought to specify
collection of data on how the frequency with which working poor households
are required to visit food stamp offices affects their participation. 261 Without
this information, policymakers likely would not have appreciated the need for
the set of policy initiatives that became centerpieces of both the Democratic
and the Republican policy agendas in that program from 1999 to 2002. 262
Moreover, even if a contractor chooses to collect some additional data, it
likely will lack the experience with the program required to identify what
information is most likely to have future value to policymakers. This can be a
significant problem when data analysis is contracted out. For example, the
debate on immigrants' eligibility for public benefits that took place in 1994-96
suffered from the lack of meaningful analysis of immigrants' patterns of
participation by the major programs' data contractors. The information shortage
would have been far worse if the public agencies had failed to require that the
contractors collect samples that could later be reanalyzed with new policy
questions in mind.
3. Problems with ObtainingOperationalInformation
One of the most valuable sources of information about a program is that
obtained in the course of administering it. Numerous policy changes, large and
small, have sprung from the experiences of state and local administrators. For
example, eligibility workers may notice that policies are having an unintentionally harsh impact on the homeless, domestic violence survivors, or other
particularly vulnerable groups and complain up the ranks of their agencies to
260. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
261. Many of the options for food stamp program simplification in the 2002 Farm Bill,
such as semi-annual reporting, were motivated by data that showed that virtually all of the decline
in nationwide program participation occurred in states that had increased their reliance on short
certification periods for working families with children. Data on the length of certification periods
had rarely taken on policy significance in previous years, and the USDA staff that decided to start
compiling it long before the surge in short certification periods had no reason to believe it would
eventually become pivotal. That staff, however, works closely with program administrators and
therefore had a sense that certification periods were a sufficiently important aspect of program
administration to be worth monitoring.
262. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 9, at 1305-08 (describing regulatory
initiatives of the Clinton Administration and legislative initiatives of both the Bush Administration
and Senate Republicans to reduce the administrative burden of food stamp participation).
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their senior managers. Those managers, in turn, may either change the policy or
inform elected officials of the reasons why they should consider doing so.
Once administration has been turned over to private contractors,
information obtained during program administration likely will become
unavailable to policymakers. Once a program's administration is privatized,
state and federal officials making program policy no longer have direct
involvement with the people carrying out that policy. Although contractors'
eligibility workers may see problems developing, the contractors will have
incentives not to pass those concerns along to state or federal officials if
changing the policies would adversely affect their profitability. For example,
eligibility workers might see many apparently eligible working families
abandoning their applications when told about the contractor's policy of requiring applicants' employers to submit frequent earnings statements. This
could raise questions about whether these verification practices are disadvantaging the working poor and undermining the program's emphasis on work. If
the contractor's performance is judged in part based on the error rate it
achieves, however, the contractor may feel it unwise to alert state officials to
this problem because working families' eligibility is more difficult to
determine. The contractor also may fear that the state will prohibit these
requests of employers, preventing the contractor from achieving as low an error
rate.
Alternative sources of information about program operations may also
prove ineffective, in part because contractors' policies are so opaque. In past
years, Congress and federal administrators often learned about problems in
states' administration of a program from law suits filed by legal services
offices. In 1995, however, Congress prohibited federally-funded legal services
programs from filing class action law suits. Some states have legal services
programs that do not receive federal funds and therefore could bring suit, but
most of these are small, overworked, and unable to muster the resources required for litigation. More broadly, because contractors may not be required to
make their policies publicly available, legal services advocates may have
difficulty discerning the difference between isolated misapplications of policy
and deliberate denials of service.
The news media also may have difficulty identifying problems with contractors' administration because contractors are not subject to state open
records laws. As noted above, contractors may regard their policies and
procedures as proprietary and refuse to release them to the public. Reporters
may still hear that a contractor is inexplicably denying benefits to eligible
people. But without access to the contractor's policy materials and instructions
for eligibility workers, they may be unable to determine whether the denials are
the kind of isolated problems that are inevitable in any large program or part of
a broader pattern.
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4. Misattributionof Costs and Benefits

Privatization further fragments the delivery of public services. As such, it
can be expected to increase the frequency of the public's attribution errors,
namely beliefs that the government is performing functions actually entrusted
to private contractors or vice versa. These263errors commonly distort the public's
opinions about government performance.
Where a private company takes applications for a publicly-funded
program, some members of the electorate may believe that the benefits
dispensed are partially or wholly corporate philanthropy. 264 Even if they
understand that government funds are involved, they may not understand the
terms on which those funds were provided, e.g., whether the government is
reimbursing all valid claims (providing a "responsive entitlement" as in
Medicaid) 265 or has provided the vendor a lump sum and discretion about how
to allocate it. This confusion will prevent voters from formulating an informed
response to perceived denials of needy claimants. Similarly, the public may
misunderstand which level of the government is funding the program a
contractor operates. If the electorate believes a federally-funded program is in
fact operating with state and local tax dollars, it may overestimate the
efficiency of those levels of the government-and the merit of maintaining or
increasing state and local taxes-while making opposite errors with respect to
the federal government.266

Just as a highly visible private vendor may inappropriately prevent the
government from receiving credit for benefits it funds, the public is likely to
blame governmental incompetence when a low-profile vendor errs. Although
badly selecting or supervising vendors is indeed a failure of the agency, it is a
different kind of failure that may be subject to a different kind of solution. Believing that the government is operating a program incompetently, voters may
conclude that the problem is incurable and the program is best dismantled; if
they understood that a contractor was making the errors in question, they might
prefer to maintain the program but to change its method of administration.
C. Agency Problems

When applied to the private sector, the theory of the firm typically

263. See KELLY & RIVENBARK, supra note 116, at 114-15.
264. Already, states' renaming of their public benefit programs has confused recipients
sufficiently to cause major government surveys to undercount participants in those programs. See
EVALUATING WELFARE REFORM IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION 113-14 (Robert A. Moffitt & Michele
Ver Ploeg eds., 2001).
265. See Super, Political Economy, supra note 6, at 654-55 (distinguishing between
responsive entitlements and capped programs).
266. See Super, FiscalFederalism, supra note 215, at 2584 (noting the tendency for state
and local governments to receive credit for the full output of federal-state programs rather than
only for the share that they finance).
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identifies agency problems as a cost of internal production. 267 Privatization can
reduce public benefit programs' efficiency in producing utility for the
electorate by exacerbating agency problems. Elected and appointed officials
inevitably have their own agendas that diverge in significant respects from that
of the electorate. Subsection 1, however, demonstrates that privatization can
significantly increase the intensity of self-interested lobbying that seeks both to
expand the total budgets of these programs beyond the level required to satisfy
the electorate and to increase the share of that budget devoted to administration.
Subsection 2 explores the incentives officials may have to take more risks in
privatization contracts than the electorate likely would prefer because of the
likelihood that negative impacts will fall on their successors or on the federal
government. Finally, Subsection 3 considers the risk of the most direct assault
on public officials' reliability as agents of the electorate: corruption.
1. Lobbying by Public Employees and PrivateContractors

Whoever is performing important functions in a public benefit program
will have a focused interest in the continuation and expansion of that program.
Thus, for example, the Food Marketing Institute, representing the major
supermarket chains, supports the Food Stamp Program. Likewise, the trade
associations representing children's hospitals, public hospitals, and community
health centers champion the Medicaid program that covers many of their
patients. By the same token, whoever administers these programs will become
a natural, self-interested proponent of them.
The advocacy of non-recipients deriving financial benefit from these programs, while legitimate, threatens to skew public policymaking. As Anthony
Downs and Mancur Olson demonstrated, a small group with a focused interest
in a particular issue can easily dominate a popular majority that disagrees but
feels less motivation to participate. 68 The result may be programs larger than
those the electorate would prefer. In addition, whatever these programs'
budgets, those administering them are likely to lobby for allocating a larger
share of funds to administration and a correspondingly smaller share to
benefits. 269 They also may oppose policy changes in whatever direction if
See DEMSETZ, supra note 76, at 25-28 (terming this problem managerial "shirking").
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 60-65 (1971) (describing the dynamic that allows small groups with focused
interest to dominate majorities with contrary views); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY 265-74 (1957) (explaining why majorities may rationally abstain from voting and
allow a narrow economic minority to impose policies the majority opposes).
269. Lest anyone doubt the effectiveness of this lobbying, it should be noted that even with
increases in the number of people living in poverty during each of the last four years, states have
devoted an ever-increasing share of the TANF block grant to payments to contractors of all kinds,
with barely a quarter of those funds now going to sustain low-income families. See Mark
Greenberg, Dir. of Policy, Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy, Presentation at the National Association of
State Budget Officers Eastern/Southern Regional Meeting: The TANF Fiscal Structure: Trends,
Implications of Reauthorization and Katrina 15 (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
267.

268.
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those changes are likely to increase administrative workloads more than they
increase administrative compensation. To the extent that contractors succeed in
blocking change, programs' designs will gradually drift apart from the
electorate's preferences. This lobbying therefore makes public officials less
efficient and accurate agents for the public. The administrative arrangement
that results in the least effective lobbying therefore will improve the political
process's efficiency in meeting the electorate's goals for the design of these
programs. 270
By this standard, public administration of public benefit programs is likely
to be the most desirable option, with the award of large sole-source operating
contracts the least. To be sure, public employees' unions often maintain active
legislative arms that lobby for increased spending on administration. They are
limited, however, in their use of members' dues for political purposes. The
unions also face free-rider problems in seeking voluntary political contributions
from their members. Moreover, in many areas, the public employees that
administer means-tested programs are not organized. In addition, some states
follow the federal government in restricting the political activity of their
employees. Finally, public employees' unions' lobbyists have a number of
other ways of advancing the interests of front-line eligibility workers, such as
mandating improvements in the pay and benefits of all state employees; the
extent to which they will focus on programmatic policy issues is uncertain.
Large contractors, on the other hand, are likely to be more effective at
lobbying because they can organize their lobbying efforts surrounding
programs much more efficiently. For most activities, contractors can spend corporate profits directly. 271 Even where individual contributions are required
(e.g., for donations to the campaigns of influential legislators), those can be
secured from a relatively small, cohesive group of owners and executives
whose future employment will be jeopardized should they fail to help.
Contractors also lack other obvious means of advancing their interests in their
relationships with the government besides policy advocacy, so their incentives
http://www.clasp.org/publications/nasbogreenberg_9-19.pdf
270.
Some of these programs' supporters might disagree, preferring to give more politically
powerful interests a stake in the programs' continuation and expansion. This view is shortsighted.
First, a program that has grown over time not because of broader public appreciation of its value
but because of the quiet lobbying of special interests will be particularly vulnerable when a
recession or changing fiscal agenda calls for budget cuts. Second, lobbying that bloats a program's
administrative budget will cause the program to develop a reputation for inefficiency, again
increasing its long-term political vulnerability. Third, it is unclear whether administrators' lobbying to increase the share of total spending devoted to administration will reduce spending on
benefits more or less than their efforts to increase the program's total spending will expand
benefits.
271.
Programs' rules may not permit direct reimbursement of lobbying costs. See, e.g.,
Principles for Determining Costs Applicable to Administration of the Food Stamp Program by
State Agencies, 7 C.F.R. § 277 app. A (2007). Nonetheless, they do allow contractors to make
profits, and contractors can elect to spend some of those profits lobbying for policies that will lead
to more profitable contracts in the future.
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to lobby are strong: there are no generic benefit packages for contractors, and
most politically plausible changes in contracting requirements are unlikely to
produce significant gains.
Vendors hired as needed to assist claimants likely represent an
intermediate case. On the one hand, they can marshal the profits from their
administrative work to support lobbying, resembling sole-source contractors
more than public administrative agencies. On the other hand, if a relatively
large number of vendors are involved, free riders may hamper efforts to
organize lobbying.
2.

Excessive Risk-Taking

Supporters often present privatization as a means of saving the public
money. As discussed above, however, contracting for complex, difficult-tospecify activities such as application preparation and eligibility determination
could subject a program to massive financial losses if the contractor is unable
to perform as required or if it authorizes benefits to large numbers of ineligible
claimants. These losses would damage the program directly and undermine
public confidence in its stewardship of taxpayer funds. Because the losses often
will be realized during a different political administration than the one that
initiated the privatization, these risks pose serious agency problems: public
officials may be far less risk-averse in deciding to privatize programs than the
electorate that "owns" the program. 272
The costs of this excessive risk-taking are likely to be born by the
electorate. No contractor will be able to afford to cover the costs of additional
benefits conferred because of serious administration problems. Contractors, unlike states, can declare bankruptcy. The burden of any significant losses
therefore will almost certainly accrue to either state or federal governments.
In practice, the federal government will likely bear the brunt of the cost
because turnover among state and federal officials and other limitations on the
federal-state relationship make it difficult to protect the federal government
from severe financial losses if an experiment goes wrong. For example, in the
early 1990s, Florida moved to implement an ambitious new system for
automating many aspects of the eligibility determination process for the state's
Food Stamp Program. Florida rapidly implemented the system statewide and
Indiana's privatization contract, for example, spans ten years, with the promised
272.
savings heavily backloaded. See Theodore Kim, $1.16B Deal is Sealed: Welfare Goes Private,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 28, 2006, at 1. Even if he is reelected, Governor Daniels will have been
out of office almost four years before the contract ends. Ordinarily, one might expect politicians to
want to reap quick savings and leave their successors to foot the bill. If, however, the goal is
ideological-to eliminate the programs' public infrastructure-concealing the adverse
consequences of the change until the bureaucracy has been disbanded prevents opposition from
coalescing in time, as it did in Texas. Legislators not subject to time limits may have longer-term
perspectives, but they may lack the analytical resources to identify hidden risks in plans governors
are promoting.
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ran into severe difficulties. The automated system mishandled numerous cases,
and the state's food stamp error rate spiked. In 1992 alone, Florida over-issued
more than $200 million in food stamps. Although the federal food stamp
quality control (QC) system assessed a correspondingly large penalty, by that
time the Republican governor who had rushed through the implementation of
the flawed automation system had left office. His Democratic successor
struggled to correct the problem but argued that imposing such a large penalty
for something his predecessor had done would hobble his new administration.
In the end, the Clinton Administration required Florida to spend some
unmatched state funds to correct its system but did not collect any of the
assessed QC penalty. The federal government absorbed all of the $200 million
loss caused by Florida's hasty experiment with automation. Similarly, in 2003,
the Bush Administration forgave a nine-figure QC penalty against California
when Governor Schwarzenegger argued that he should not have to pay for
errors resulting from a deficient automation system mismanaged by his Democratic predecessor.
These examples show that the federal government, under either party's
leadership, is likely to incur substantial losses rather than extract payment from
states whose former leaders presided over catastrophic failures of state administration. Similarly, both Republican and Democratic administrations have
declined to require subsequent governors to make good on their predecessors'
commitments that demonstration projects would be cost-neutral to the federal
government. The same thing could happen again if the current privatization
proposals go awry.
These problems lack obvious solutions. Requiring state officials to bear
severe fiscal burdens for their predecessors' blunders does nothing to deter
future incompetence. Indeed, depleting a program's current funding to pay for
past losses is likely to hamper the costly business of rebuilding a sound
administrative structure. Federal financial participation in these programs
273
typically reflects states' lack of fiscal capacity to bear the costs themselves.
The choices for absorbing these losses therefore often will be federal and state
administrations, neither of which were implicated in the mismanagement that
caused the losses. However those losses are divided, the electorate is likely to
become dissatisfied with the program once substantial losses come to light. The
program's future funding may be reduced as a result, even though, with the
administrative misadventure terminated, it will again be capable of providing
the relief the electorate sought at a politically acceptable cost.

273. See Super, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 215, at 2574-77 (identifying the federal
government's superior fiscal capacity as a prime cause of federal-state cooperation on spending
programs).
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Corruption

Corrupt officials are the least effective agents for the electorate. Some
firms seeking administrative contracts have immense resources; others are
smaller but exceedingly well-connected.274 Several of the most prominent and
audacious efforts to privatize operation of public benefit programs have
collapsed in bidding scandals. Most prominently, Florida's relentless lobbying
had secured tentative federal approval for waivers to allow wholesale
privatization of application assistance and eligibility determinations for food
stamps and Medicaid when the state inspector general reported that the head of
the Department of Children and Families had been deciding competitions
involving a firm where his former boss, who had recommended the Department
head for his current job, was on the board of directors. Other top officials
involved in the privatization effort stayed in the beach house of an officer of a
Ethical
bidder and had a range of questionable contacts with competitors.
275
problems also plagued New York City's welfare privatization plans.
Neither the number of attempts at privatization nor the number of
documented instances of corruption are sufficient to support any meaningful
empirical conclusions regarding connections between the two. As a theoretical
matter, however, privatization of program operations seems to pose significant
risks not present in state-administered models. In sole-source privatization, a
single decision made by one person or a small group of people will convey a
large financial benefit on the successful bidder. Although senior officials in
human services agencies routinely make decisions affecting large sums of
money, the winners and losers from those decisions are much more diffuse:
even changes in Medicaid's reimbursement rates for hospital care affect
institutions spread across the state. Therefore, structures that may suffice to
keep officials loyal to their principal, the electorate, when making policy may
fail to guard against illicit influences in the award and oversight of large
contracts.
Systems built on the as-needed purchase of administrative services are
subject to several risks of corruption, although even cumulatively they are
probably less severe than those surrounding large contracts. Where the
program's structure puts claimants in the position of purchasing the services,
the claimants may be ill-equipped to assess the effectiveness or value of the
services they receive. To keep unscrupulous or simply lazy vendors from
siphoning off excessive shares of benefit dollars-thereby undermining the
electorate's goal in establishing the program-officials may wish to establish
some audit mechanism for the fees charged. Because its place in the program
may seem relatively esoteric, however, the audit system is unlikely to be well-

274.

See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 225, at 152-54.

275.

See Eric Lipton, Hevesi Accuses Mayor of Cover-Up in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 28, 2001, at B3.
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funded. In addition, the potential for providers illicitly to induce auditors to
look elsewhere cannot be discounted. At the other extreme, auditors may seek
more business by corrupting individual decision-makers within the public
agency to increase their success rates. Low-level bribery, of course, is always a
risk when agencies dispense money. Creating repeated interactions between
officials and private vendors of administrative services may increase that risk
by allowing more cases to be covered by a single corrupt transaction. Vendors
marketing to the public also may be tempted to employ corrupt means to get
included on lists of recommended providers.
CONCLUSION

The narrow lesson from this analysis is that neither economic theory nor
experience to date justifies the current movement to expand the private sector's
already substantial role in public benefit programs. Moreover, we should be
suspicious of the head-long rush to implement these radical changes without
pilot projects subject to rigorous, in-depth evaluation. 276 This haste prevents the
government from negotiating broader contracts from a position of strength (i.e.,
while it is still free to decline to work with contractors) rather than seeking
modifications to an extant contract after it has disbanded its own infrastructure.
To the extent contractors' role in program administration expands, the
government should impose strict limits on their ability to protect as proprietary
information, or to destroy, the policies under which they administer the
program and the files and data they compile in doing so.
The implications of the public benefits contracting experience, however,
are much broader. The privatization movement still seeks legitimacy through
references to needless government operation of activities well-handled by
business 277 just as antitrust populists invoke the misdeeds of long-dead robber
barons. 278 In fact, the movement's efforts reach far beyond the areas where
economic theory offers any plausible basis for expecting efficiency gains. For
example, President Bush and others want to purchase investment services on
the private market to replace Social Security. 279 The United States has
276. In other contexts, conservatives have advocated rigorous evaluation of programs
before expanding their implementation. See Robert Rector & Michael McLaughlin, A
Conservative's Guide to State-Level Welfare Reform, in MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK: A
CONSERVATIVE AGENDA FOR THE STATES 137, 154 (Tex Lezar ed., 1992) (finding reports of job

training programs' success "pseudo-scientific"). Careful evaluation should continue after any rollout, both to identify corrections needed within the states affected and to help develop expertise to
guide any future contracting ventures. This is particularly true because of the reduced availability
of programmatic data that is otherwise likely when the state agency is displaced.
277.

See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 122.

278. See BORK, supra note 32, at 197.
279. The President and his allies have been ambiguous about whether these services would
be purchased with a few multi-year contracts-a government-selected oligopoly-or with
purchases of these services as needed. They also have been unclear how purchasing authority
would be divided between the government and claimants.
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increasingly relied on private contractors to provide combat
forces for missions
280
services.
uniformed
its
commit
to
unwilling
is
to which it
Like yesteryear's most heedless populist champions of applying antitrust
to atomize large corporations, the privatizers hover between practical and
ideological arguments. They assert, often as if it were a proven fact, that privatization will save the government money. They thus cast their opponents as
irrationally holding onto obscure values of dubious worth. An increasing body
of empirical research, however, suggests that privatization of many public
functions costs rather than saves the public money.28 1 The economic theory
presented here suggests that, far from being flukes, these results are entirely
predictable and are likely to be repeated in subsequent attempts.
The next question presented is how to convince privatizers of the
problems with widespread privatization. Appeals to public values alone seem
unlikely to prevail. Reflexive hostility to the government is too widespread, and
any meaningful consensus on many of the key values wielded against
privatization is, sadly, a distant dream in our angry and polarized society. Just
as the Chicago School tamed antitrust law by framing its arguments in terms of
consumer welfare that could appeal to liberals, critics of privatization must
focus more on efficiency.
A good place to start is to treat the privatizers as advocating a change in
the government's "make-or-buy" decisions and to analyze them under the
theory of the firm. Approached in this manner, the defects of Social Security
privatization become readily apparent.282 Investing has formidable economies
of scale. A considerable body of expertise and information is required for savvy
investing, but once amassed is available to guide as many investments as are
required. In addition, many advantageous opportunities are wholly unavailable
to individual investors. Moreover, small investors have difficulty diversifying
their portfolios to reduce risk. Other factors identified by theory also militate
against shifting from internal investment to the market: the high transaction
costs (commissions) of organizing individual investments, many retirees'
aversion to risk, and the lack of any serious agency problems preventing the
electorate from guiding SSA.
Judge Posner argues that antitrust enforcement is appropriate when, but
only when, it increases business efficiency. 283 A sound principle to guide
privatization decisions is that the government should obtain services on the
private market when, but only when, doing so would increase a program's
efficiency in satisfying the electorate. This measure is not pure economic

280. See generally Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional,
Democratic,and Strategic Problems with PrivatizingWar, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004).
281. See supranotes 119 and 133 and accompanying text.
282.
See generally HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER,
REFORM: THE GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE (rev. & updated ed. 2001).

283.

POSNER, ANTITRUST 2d ed., supra note 38, at 2-5.
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efficiency because the electorate does not authorize governmental programs
purely to achieve a financial bottom line. On the other hand, the electorate has
made clear that its intolerance for waste in public programs goes far beyond
anything that cost-benefit analysis could explain. Thus, economic efficiency
should guide the government's "make-or-buy" decisions unless the most
efficient arrangement is likely to distort policymaking or offend strongly-held
values sufficiently to decrease the satisfaction the electorate can derive from
the program.
This standard would require liberals to abandon some sentimental
attachments to public provision when the private sector demonstrably can do
better. On the other hand, it also would preserve the basic infrastructure that
makes a humane society administratively feasible. With that infrastructure
facing the gravest threats since the New Deal, that is a trade well worth making.
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